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This article examines the theoretical and practical issues relating
to the resolution of trade disputes within regional integration arrange-
ments in developing countries in general, and within the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in particular.
This examination will focus mainly on the institutions that exist for the
resolution of trade disputes and at whose initiative they can be set in
motion. A further examination will deal with what body of laws the
various dispute resolution institutions regard as supreme and the rem-
edies that are available.
Because of the relative frailty of regional institutions in the devel-
oping world coupled with the relative unsophistication of domestic
dispute resolution regimes, a critical analysis of the differentiation be-
tween dispute avoidance and dispute resolution will be undertaken.
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms will also be explored.
* J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School; LL.M. Yale Law School, 1992; LL.B. University of
Nairobi, 1989; Lecturer, University of Nairobi.
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II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: LAW OR POLICY
At a general level, integration arrangements have often spawned
technical and ideological investigations into whether dispute resolu-
tion should be the preserve of political discourse or whether it should
be understood as a purely legal matter with limited political input. It
is not perplexing that this is the case. Dispute resolution, at least
where an effective system exists and where the system is an external
one, requires the approbation of decisions of the dispute resolution
organization which, to say the least, nettles the perceived loss of sov-
ereignty that integration always produces. Even states with sophisti-
cated internal legal systems which have had a long history of
international relations, such as the United States,' surprisingly exhibit
the same reluctance.
The debate in its wider context highlights the intimate nexus be-
tween politics and integration processes. Both in integration
processes of the developed and developing worlds, politics seem to
interfere and govern the general direction of practically all policies.2
However, developed countries have had some success in delineating
the two after an initial political determination has been made.3 The
history of integration processes among developing countries shows
that it is not possible to dislodge politics from any aspect of the inte-
gration process, including dispute resolution, nor is it credible to
speak of a distinction between politics and technical matters.4 This
1 William Graham, addressing the issue in the context of the GATr Uruguay talks has
stated that:
The United States had at least, until then, always resisted the notion of a dispute resolution.
The United States Senate had indicated clearly in the Nicaragua case that it was not in the
tradition of the United States to accept the surrender of sovereignty where a multilateral
body would determine binding rules, interpret them, and say: 'United States, you must do
this, or you must do that.' The Europeans were even less willing to accept that.
William Graham, Remarks, Economic Development in the Third World- What Can be Expected
from the GATT Uruguay Round? 81 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 578, 590-91 (1987).
This attitude is also reflected in the dispute resolution regime of the North American Free
Trade Agreement NAFTA process. See art. 2003-2022 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, done December 17, 1992 at Washington/Mexico City/Ottawa.
2 It has been stated that "[t]he weakness of any theoretical framework that downplays the
role of politics in the integration process has been demonstrated in experiences in Europe and all
developing regions." Jeggan C. Senghor, Theoretical Foundations for Regional Integration in
Africa: An Overview, in REGONAL INTEGRAION IN AFRICA: UNFINISHED AGENDA 17, 22
(1990).
3 This demarcation is achieved by providing that while the decision to undertake a certain
course of action is a political one, the implementation of the decision should be governed by
technical institutions and procedures.
4 "So-called technical issues cannot be isolated from political issues as they often require




political input and interference have been so pervasive that they have
been accepted as part and parcel of integration processes.5
As an academic enterprise it is permissible to draw attention to
this interrelationship but it is unrealistic to justify6 this dynamic in the
current world political and economic set up. It is submitted that poli-
tics should be restricted to the initial decisions of joining an integra-
tion process7 and should make an exit thereafter. The problem with a
thesis that rationalizes and extols the nexus between politics and inte-
gration is that it justifies and legitimizes the continued politicization of
integration processes and fails to acknowledge that by and large, polit-
ical chauvinism has been responsible for the collapse of many integra-
tion processes, particularly in developing countries. The choice to
enter a regional integration process must be a political one, but the
implementation of the process must be technical. Transnational trade
can only be successful where technical devices facilitate its implemen-
tation and in this regard, political interference cannot be said to be an
amplifying factor to increased transnational trade. It is, therefore, in-
exact to state that no sensible and imperative demarcation can be
made between the role of politics and the adoption of technical legal
devices.8
Having stated the above, it would be irresponsible to ignore the
realities under which integration processes in developing countries
have hitherto had to operate. The political leaders in developing
countries are responsible for the implementation of the processes and
there is hardly any collective response by the constituent members of
these processes. Nor is there any power outside government that can
influence the scope and direction of integration. Under this scenario
the political influence of the leaders of the constituent entities is
greatly exaggerated and it is only through political negotiation that
5 To justify this political encroachment it is said that "in societies with low levels of speciali-
zation, low pluralism and lack of functionally specific groups, spill over between economic and
political areas is unlikely to be too high, in the sense that economic issues are not perceived as
technical but political." Senghor, supra note 2, at 23.
6 See Senghor, supra note 2.
7 Quite clearly, the decision to bind a sovereign state to an international organization is,
strictly speaking, a political decision by the political organs of the particular state.
8 The ability to make this distinction is probably a function of age and sophistication of the
regional process concerned. With reference to the European Community it is clear that initially
lawyers and political scientists had a common agenda and therefore acted in concert. But with
time "[t]he rapid growth in the quantity and increased complexity of Community law has over-
shadowed, even obscured, its systemic significance. The practice and study of Community law
has necessitated a breakdown of what was initially an integral discipline into many sub-branches,
each calling for specific and profound specialization." Joseph Weiler, Community, Member
States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant? 21 J.COMM. MKrT. STUD. 39 (1982).
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decisions can be made.9 In these circumstances, the role of law is im-
mensely circumscribed and even where a theoretical separation is pos-
sible, the political and legal outcomes always intersect.'0 To this
extent, integration processes in developing countries have suffered
from the relegation of dispute settlement to the realms of politics and
policy," bolstering the view that issues dealing with regional integra-
tion are matters of policy, not law. 2
Ill. CHOICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS
Different organizations have adopted different systems of resolv-
ing disputes.' 3 This diversity in the way disputes are determined re-
flects both diversity in the domestic laws14 of the constituent members
and the peculiarity of individual integration processes. Painting with
broad strokes, integration processes in developed countries generally
9 It is, therefore, accurate to conclude that "where power, not law, defines relations within a
political system, negotiation is the paramount mechanism for resolving conflict." STUART A.
ScmEiNOOLo, Tim RuLE OF LAW IN EuROPEAN INTrGRATION, 8 (1965). This is not to suggest
that political power does not influence the integration dynamics of developed countries but the
narrow point sought to be made here is that this power-infiltration is more acute in developing
countries.
10 There is a risk of overstating the significance of the distinction between law and politics
and forgetting that this distinction is often times an academic exercise as it is, to say the least,
arduous to make this distinction in real life. As Weiler cautions: "'law' encompasses a discourse
that is much wider than the doctrine and norms and that the very dichotomy of law and politics
is questionable." JLH.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403, 2409
(1991).
11 See Senghor, supra note 2, at 22. The lack of a formal acknowledgement of a legal regime
for the settlement of disputes stifles the emergence of a supranational regime. Supranationality
in this case being defined as "the governments of the Member States are-in matters specified in
the treaty-bound by decisions of the [regional] institutions." See also, ScHmlNGOL, supra note
9, at 13. Pierre Pescatore defines supranationality as "the recognition by a group of states of a
complex of common interests or, more broadly, a complex of common values; the creation of an
effective power placed at the service of these interests or values; finally, the autonomy of this
power." PIERRE PESCATORE, Tim LAW OF INTEGRATION: EMERGENCE OF A NEW PHENOME-
NON IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNi-
TrEs 50 (1974).
12 Molina Orantes, Colloquium, Certain Legal Aspects of Inter-American Cooperation, 5 GA.
J. INT'L & Comp. L. 141, 160 (1975).
13 E.g., the European Community has a court and an elaborate supranational organization;
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement utilizes a binational panel review. For more discussion
see generally, Andrew Anderson & Alan Rugman, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade AgreemenL Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 6 J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1989 at 65.
14 The United States generally is reluctant to cede dispute settlement to an international
tribunal and even where this occurs, United States domestic courts overly scrutinize these
awards. See supra note 1. See also Note, The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement and
the U.S. Constitution. Does Article 111 Allow Binational Panel Review of Anti-dumping and




tend to utilize fairly autonomous supranational bodies to resolve dis-
putes. On the other hand developing countries, when they provide for
dispute settlement at all,'5 rely on more informal mechanisms. 6 Two
basic factors generate this dichotomy.
First, regional integration initiatives in developing countries are
almost always conceived of as economic ventures and economists rou-
tinely are in-charge of their formulation.' 7 These economists often
are responsible for drawing up the legal framework of integration
processes and have a tendency to de-emphasize the role of lawyers
and legal regimes.' 8 This hostility towards lawyers and legal regimes
stems from the conviction held by many of these economists that in-
corporation of lawyers in negotiations tends to complicate and frus-
trate the quick conclusion of otherwise simple arrangements. 19
Second, because most integration processes in developing coun-
tries are heavily politicized with political heads involved in policy-
making and policy-execution, there has been a tendency to concen-
trate more on integration prototypes that emphasize dispute avoid-
ance rather than dispute resolution.20 The perception is that strict
regimes for dispute resolution might be harmful rather than beneficial
to integration processes in developing countries.2 ' In the context of
the political dynamics in most of these processes, this view has some
15 Creating a regional process without a dispute settlement regime is not all too uncommon
with developing countries. With respect to the ANDEAN process, "although the signatories of
the agreement drafted a comprehensive blueprint for the integrated development of the subre-
gion, they neglected to include a body capable of resolving the disputes which the implementa-
tion of their program would inevitably entail." Tmothy O'Leary, The ANDEAN Common
Market and the Importance of Effective Dispute Resolution Procedures, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW., Winter 1984, at 101, 101-02.
16 This does not say anything at all about the efficacy of either system, as informal disputes
settlement regimes have been shown to be equally, or even more, efficient than their elaborate
institutionalized counterparts. See infra notes 37-43, and accompanying text.
17 The author was able to meet extremely few legal experts in the numerous workshops,
seminars and conferences convened by the PTA and COMESA.
18 See Note, The Role of the ANDEAN Court in Consolidating Regional Integration Efforts,
10 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 351, 352 (1980).
19 This reliance on economic and financial aspects in integration and the exclusion of lawyers
has proven to be utopian. See David Padilla, The Judicial Resolution of Legal Disputes in the
Integration Movements of the Hemispher 11 LAW. AM. 75, 91 (1979).
20 The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement may be seen as an exception in this case because
it relied greatly on dispute avoidance unlike most of its sister organizations in the developed
world. See The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: New Directions in Dispute Settlement 83
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRo. 251, 253 (1989).
21 As ambassador Valerie T. McCombie of Barbados has stated "[t]he question is whether
we should have [dispute settlement] mechanisms at all, that is to say, whether the establishment
of dispute settlement mechanisms will induce more disputes." See Colloquium, supra note 12, at
158.
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cogency.22 So that whenever the subject of dispute settlement crops
up in negotiations or is eventually recognized in the integration trea-
ties, it is very noticeable that a consensus approach has been designed
into the system.23 Of course it is a misnomer to speak of dispute
avoidance as a specie of dispute resolution because this presupposes
that the system has been contrived in such a way that no disputes can
ever arise; clearly an unrealistic prospect. The consequence is that
when disputes arise, as is natural to happen, the system has no an-
swers and no mechanisms to reconcile these differences. This in turn
prompts unilateral responses by individual member countries, produc-
ing a domino effect which culminates, eventually, in the disintegration
of the process. 24 To be more exact, a system that relies on dispute
avoidance reduces the arrangement to a mere benevolent association
or an international conference, for one of the most important charac-
teristics necessary for an entity to become a formally recognized inter-
national organization is its ability to provide for the resolution of
disputes.25
22 From a jurisprudential point of view, countries that prefer dispute avoidance to dispute
resolution are merely avoiding the creation of "hard" law within their own domestic jurisdictions
and on themselves. A functional dispute resolution will, of course, precipitate binding decisions
which will infringe on the free exercise of power by these political sovereigns. For a general
discussion on "hard" and "soft" law, see A. HmscmnAN, Exrr, Voice AND LOYALTY - RE-
SPONSES TO DE cLINE IN FIRMs, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970).
23 E.g., art. 14 of the Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, July
4, 1981, reproduced in 20 I.L.M. 1166, provides for conciliation. For a further discussion of the
workings of this system, see P.K. Menon, The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States - An
Important Milestone in Sub-Regional Integration, 17 U. MIAmi INTER-Am. L. REv. 297, 309
(1986).
Under the general umbrella of the Treaty of Montevideo, disputes are supposed to be re-
solved by way of negotiations between the disputants. Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes,
signed at Ascuncion, Paraguay, Sept. 2, 1967, Chap. II, art. 4.
Art. 23 of the Agreement on ANDEAN Sub-regional Integration, signed at Bogota, May 26,
1969, provides that:
The Commission shall be empowered to execute any procedures of negotiation, good of-
fices, mediation and conciliation that may be necessary in cases of disputes arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the present Agreement, or of the Commission
Decisions.
24 Timothy O'Leary concludes that "each responsive act of non-compliance in turn triggers a
divisive reaction, acquiring momentum as each country individually responds to the others' vio-
lations. These inconsistent implementations not only prevent the attainment of a program's
goals, but also signal a program-by-program demise of [the integration process]." O'Leary,
supra note 15, at 115.
25 For an explanation of the necessary elements for the recognition of an international or-
ganization, see generally Michel Virally, Definition and Classification of International Organiza-




The decision to prefer a particular system of dispute resolution or
to have such a system at all also reflects the power dynamics within an
integration process. In much the same way that law functions in do-
mestic jurisdictions,26 weaker states within a regional process fre-
quently are the ones that insist on the provision of an elaborate
dispute resolution regime.27 This is a true postulate for integration
processes in both developed and developing countries.28 Although all
integration processes exhibit some inequality - no two or more coun-
tries can be at exactly the same level of development - disparities
within integration processes in developing countries are excessively
magnified. This complicates generally the choice and operation of dis-
pute resolution mechanisms. The more developed members would
normally insist on a system that is expeditious and responsive while
the less developed members place more preeminence on the ability of
the system to withstand manipulation by the stronger members, even
if this generates higher legal and economic transaction costs.29 Put
another way, poor members are always suspicious of the intentions of
their relatively rich counterparts and are generally negative towards
innovative procedures which do not have strict safeguards built into
them.
Another intricacy that integration processes in developing coun-
tries have to deal with, and which is induced by a lack of a formal
dispute resolution regime, is result determinism. Where disputants
are forced to grope about awkwardly for resolution of their conflict
there is a strong likelihood that disputants will intuitively select that
process that best furthers their respective interests. The consequence
is that each disputant will "resort to a process that increases the likeli-
26 It is a general truism that in the domestic sphere, poor, deprived and generally economi-
cally and politically disadvantaged groups look to the law for social equalization and insurance
against the imperious use of economic and political power by privileged elites.
27 Within the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, the Canadians were of the view that it
was impossible to import general principles of international trade law into the arrangement with-
out providing for a multilateral body to settle disputes. See Economic Development in the Third
World: What Can be Expected From the GATT Uruguay Round?, supra note 1, at 591. Undoubt-
edly this position was adopted because Canada was the weaker partner in the arrangement and
would have suffered more by having a weak dispute resolution mechanism. For further discus-
sion see The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: New Directions in Dispute Settlement, supra
note 20, at 262.
28 while negotiating the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Canada insisted that
a binding dispute resolution system was a sine qua non for its conclusion of the treaty. See The
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreemen" New Directions in Dispute Settlement, supra note 20, at 251.
29 This tension is best exemplified by the problems generated by art. 24 of the ANDEAN
Investment Code, 11 I.L.M. 576 (1972). In this case Chile, the most developed member of the
arrangement, was of the view that the Investment Code was overly restrictive and was thwarting
foreign investment.
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hood of a decision that is favourable to its interests. '30 The prolifera-
tion of likely and possible avenues of resolving a dispute generates
transaction costs in the sense that a third level mechanism will have to
be introduced to reconcile the two, or even more, conflicting deci-
sions. The end result is that a uniform construction of the legal regime
within the integration process fails to develop,3 1 a situation that fur-
ther creates legal and economic uncertainties within the process and
discourages investment and reliance on the institutions of the integra-
tion process.
The main reason why regional processes in developing countries
do not adopt monolithic dispute resolution systems has to do with the
precarious nature of the negotiations that produce these systems. Be-
cause consensus would be difficult to achieve on the issue of dispute
resolution it is frequently considered judicious to concentrate on those
areas where agreement is possible and to shelve the more complicated
issues for a later date.32 Unfortunately, these so-called "complicated
issues" do not go away, so to speak, but continue to impair the opera-
tions of the agreed issues to the extent that polarization is injected
into previously agreed upon issues. This cancerous potential of "com-
plicated issues" supports the main thesis of this study that for integra-
tion processes to work effectively, high level integration systems must
be adopted which cater to all elements needed to service the system.
A gradual step-by-step option generates dynamics of disintegration in
which the unresolved matters eat away at the stability of the settled
matters.
IV. DisPuTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE OLD PTA TREATY
The Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) Treaty33 in its treat-
ment of dispute resolution fits well into the archetypal group that
most integration treaties in developing countries belong. The relevant
30 Colloquy, Alternative Dispute Resolution in International Trade and Business, 40 ME. L.
REv. 225, 247 (1988).
31 Orrego Vicuna, La Creacion de un Tribunal de Justicia en el Grupo Andino, 15 DERECHo
DE LA INTEGRAMoN 31,37 (1974) translated in Scott Horton, Peru and ANCOM: A Study in the
Disintegration of a Common Market, 17 TEX. INT'L L. 39, 52 (1982).
32 In international negotiations, each party, obviously must indulge in result determinism
and as the choices are narrowed down during the negotiations, some parties may exhibit reluc-
tance to acquiesce to the formula being fashioned out, which in turn generates a further dispute
about the dispute system. For a support of this view see Colloquy, supra note 30, at 247.
33 Treaty for the Establishment of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern
African States, Dec. 21, 1981, 21 I.L.M 479 (1982) (hereinafter PTA).
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provisions are characteristically wide and vague.' For a start, Article
5 of the Treaty lists the Tribunal as one of the five institutions of the
PTA.3 1 The jurisdictional powers of the Tribunal are provided for
under Article 10 of the Treaty
36
The limited jurisdictional powers given to the Tribunal ensured
that it could never play any significant role in the resolution of dis-
putes if and when they arose. In fact, the Tribunal and all other treaty
mechanisms for dispute resolution under the Treaty were never con-
stituted or used primarily because the tribunal lacked sufficient juris-
diction to be able to be of meaningful use.37 However, this does not
suggest that the Treaty38 did not generate disputes or that no attempts
were made to resolve those disputes that did arise. A majority of the
disputes that arose were resolved informally with no litigation being
initiated.39 In many instances, the Secretary-General and members of
the secretariat visited member states having trade disputes and negoti-
ated amicable solutions. Such negotiations are, of course, confidential
and to protect this confidentiality the example used here will not dis-
close the identity of the parties involved. One good example of the
informal dispute resolution regime within the Treaty arose when coun-
try X demanded to be paid in Swiss Francs for its exports to another
member country, y. 40 Y, however, was insisting on effecting payment
34 To be sure, matters of detail regarding the Tribunal have been provided for by the Author-
ity by virtue of powers vested in it by Art. 10(2) of the PTA Treaty. Id. A Statute of the Tribu-
nal was adopted in 1982. See PTA Official Gazette (Authority) Vol. 1 No. I (Dec. 17, 1982)
Legal Notice No. 5 of 1982, 41.
35 Id
36 Id. Art. 10(1) provides that:
There is hereby established a judicial organ to be known as the Tribunal of the Preferential
Trade Area which shall ensure the proper application or interpretation of the provisions of
this Treaty and adjudication upon such disputes as may be referred to it in accordance with
Article 40 of this Treaty.
Art. 40 styled "Procedure For The Settlement of Disputes" in turn provides that:
Any dispute that may arise among the Member States regarding the interpretation and ap-
plication of the provisions of this treaty shall be amicably settled by direct agreement be-
tween the parties concerned. In the event of failure to settle such disputes, the matter may
be referred to the Tribunal by a party to such dispute and the decision of the Tribunal shall
be final.
37 Interview with Steven Karangizi, Legal Officer, the Preferential Trade Area Secretariat,
Lusaka, Zambia (Nov. 17, 1993).
38 See PTA, supra note 33.
39 Interview with Prega Ramsamy, Director, the PTA Secretariat, in Lusaka, Zambia (Nov.
19, 1993).
40 It is not difficult to understand why country X was insisting on payment in Swiss Francs.
The issue is one of convertibility. Whereas the Swiss Franc is a convertible currency, and as such,
country X could use it to meet international obligations on an immediate basis, the Clearing
House mechanism would require that a period of at least two months elapse before settlement
could be effectuated.
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through the PTA Clearing House.41 The Secretary-General and his
team were able to convince the exporting member country to follow
the procedures enumerated in the Treaty and go through the Clearing
House, a suggestion country X accepted.42 A similar case arose be-
tween two member states with the exporting state demanding to be
paid in Rands and the importing state insisting on using the Clearing
House facility. The problem was similarly resolved.43
The fact that such an informal mechanism was able to function is
an indicator of the number of disputes with which the Secretary-Gen-
eral dealt. It is obvious that if there were many disputes, the Secre-
tary-General and his team would not have been able to criss-cross the
region settling disputes. The principal reason affecting the number of
disputes arising and also necessitating an informal mechanism in the
resolution of these disputes is the question of locus standi. Article 40
opens with the words "Any dispute that may arise among the Member
States . . ."44 meaning that disputes are only recognized if they are
between Member States.4 The structure of the Treaty is based on
cooperation among the executives of Member States and private par-
ties have no standing to raise issues or to attempt the enforcement of
the provisions of the Treaty, especially insofar as free trade and free
competition are concerned. Because disputes were only recognized
between political elites there was a need to engage in informal negoti-
ations so as not to prick the "political egos" of the parties concerned.46
Similarly, by limiting legal standing to political entities, the number of
disputes was correspondingly reduced. The irony of this arrangement
was that those who were depended on to bring about the benefits of
integration, for instance, large-scale investors, had little real protec-
41 For a discussion of the PTA Clearing House, see P. Kenneth Kiplagat, An Institutional and




44 See PTA Treaty, supra note 33, art. 40, 21 I.L.M., at 495.
45 To be sure, the Council could request an advisory opinion from the tribunal under Art. 8
of the Statute of the PTA Tribunal but strictly speaking this could be classified as a dispute
resolution function.
46 This peculiar situation where political executives want to retain control of virtually all
aspects of integration including dispute resolution buttresses the theory that a government that
distances itself from dispute resolution also distances itself from the process through which social
problems are resolved and such a government either has to accept this exclusion as impotence or
seek to control the decisional process itself. See Leon Trakman, Privatizing Dispute Resolution
Under the Free Trade Agreement" Truth or Fancy, 40 MNE. L REv. 349 (1988).
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tion under the Treaty,47 while those who wielded authority under the
Treaty had limited ability to influence investment and similar deci-
sions. This situation meant that otherwise non-political matters be-
came politicized. A purely contractual dispute between two
individuals or entities belonging to two different Member States could
only be pursued by engaging political elites of their respective States,
and it goes without saying that government litigation necessarily en-
genders politicization of the issue.
The presence of an almost non-functional dispute resolution sys-
tem sprung largely from the fact that Member States had not acquired
judicial discipline in their respective domestic jurisdictions sufficient
to enable them to cede rights to a regional body. Further, the Treaty48
was extremely narrow in its competence to the extent that there were
few disputes that could be identified which could legitimately be said
to be under the umbrella of the Treaty.49 This judicial uncertainty of
the competence and applicability of the Treaty50 provisions and the
absence of alternative regional or domestic tribunals able to adjudi-
cate issues of international business transactions, both of which stem
from the infertile dispute resolution mechanisms of the treaty, com-
bined to frustrate meaningful expansion of trade within the region.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the emphasis on dispute resolu-
tion derives from the realization that a comprehensive, all-embracing
economic agreement requires equally varied tools for dispute
settlement.51
V. COMESA DispuTE RESOLUTION REGIMIE
The Treaty establishing COMESA 52 evinces a new attitude to-
wards the issue of dispute settlement. There is a clear recognition that
previous attempts at integration, particularly that under the PTA
Treaty,53 did not succeed partly because these attempts did not place
47 This is an imperfection exhibited by many regional processes in developing countries. Ad-
dressing this issue in the context of the ANDEAN process, Orrego Vicuna states that "[t]he
experience gained from the few years the Accord [of Cartagena] has been functioning has shown
that its mechanisms for dispute resolution are ineffectual inasmuch as they fail to provide an
answer for the legal needs of the integration process." Vicuna, supra note 31, at 52.
48 PTA, supra note 33.
49 See Karangizi, supra note 37.
50 PTA, supra note 33.
51 For a supporting view see The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement New Direc-
tions in Dispute Settlement, supra note 20, at 252.
52 Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Nov. 5, 1993,
33 IL.M. 1067 (1994) [hereinafter COMESA or The Treaty].
53 PTA, supra note 33.
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much emphasis on dispute recognition and settlement. An assessment
of the Treaty supports the inference that it is, on the whole, a market-
oriented Treaty and has responded, to a substantial degree, to the anx-
ieties of the business community. It has also reduced significantly the
input and influence of political elites in the day-to-day operations of
the integration process.
This new attitude exhibited by the Treaty can certainly be ob-
served from the preoccupation with detail under the new regime.
There was a tendency under the PTA Treaty54 to leave matters of de-
tail to further negotiation,55 to other bodies56 or to Member States to
resolve. By being as precise as possible, the COMESA Treaty has
eliminated the uncertainty that characterized many of the provisions
of its predecessor. What follows is an examination of the main ele-
ments of the dispute resolution regime in the COMESA Treaty.
A. The COMESA Court of Justice
It would help matters if the place of a regional court in the imple-
mentation of integration could be put in its proper perspective. If a
domestic analogy were used, integration would closely resemble a fed-
eration. The various Member States would, in this analogy, be compa-
rable to the various political entities forming the federation. Just as a
federation needs a federal constitution and federal institutions to har-
monize the workings of the federation, so too does an integration pro-
cess need regional institutions to realize the objectives of integration.
However, even in the absence of most other federal institutions, a fed-
eration cannot function effectively, or at all, without an independent
judiciary to guarantee an objective and neutral interpretation of the
federal constitution. A federal court compromises the competing in-
terests of the various constituent entities and delimits the precise ex-
tent of federal and state power. To this extent, therefore, the
constituent states must have full faith in the competence of the federal
court and must accord it definite powers in order to have a stable and
workable federation.57 Similarly, an integration process, in order to
attain its goals and to be able to synchronize economic and political
54 Id.
55 See id. art. 40, 21 I.L.M. at 495. This section deals with dispute settlement and calls for a
negotiated settlement as a first step to the resolution of any dispute that may arise.
56 Id. art. 10(2) 21 I.L.M. at 487, that "[tihe Statute and other matters relating to the tribunal
shall be prescribed by the Authority."
57 For a further discussion see ANDnw GREEN, POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY JURISPRU-




expectations, must possess an institution that can adjudicate these
matters in cases of dissention 8
Indeed it can be said that real integration is in fact caused by
regional courts59 because in the absence of a regional court the courts
of the constituent entities tend to generate decisions that are at an
awkward tangent to the realization of the integration targets.60
Hence, unless these divergent judicial holdings are compromised, the
whole process is subjected to dynamics of disintegration.6' Why then
have developing countries failed to appreciate this truism? The sim-
ple answer is that such a court must be sovereign, overruling national
courts, and it is this wide competence that has often times stymied
attempts to create regional courts. 62
The creation of the COMESA Court of Justice stems from the
new realization that a stable and effective integration process needs a
sound judicial framework and to this extent is a move away from the
structure of previous arrangements.63 A factor that points to this new
58 In a similar vein Green adds that:
Once the importance of law in political integration is understood, the importance of the role
of a judiciary in political integration hardly need be argued. Undoubtedly, political integra-
tion could exist without courts, just as law could exist without courts. However, for the
same reason that courts are important in the administration of law, courts are also impor-
tant in the process of political integration. Just as courts control and assure the adminstra-
tion of law, so courts control and assure the observance of political decisions which lie at the
base of political integration.
IL at 21-22.
59 One commentator has concluded that the "court of justice causes political integration in
the European Community." Id. at 28.
60 This tendency can be illustrated ciearly by the Colombia Supreme Court invalidation of
the ANDEAN Investment Code. 144 Gaceta Judicial 10 (1972), 10 Derecho De La Integracio
155 (1972) translated in 11 I.LM. 576 (1972). In this case, the presence of an ANCOM judiciary
would have voided the necessity for the Colombia's Court's construction of the Cartagena Ac-
cord. See also Horton, supra note 31, at 52.
61 In fact, in situations where a regional court does not exist, disputes or non-compliance
with provisions of the organization frequently means that unilateral measures by the "faithful"
members become the only resort which weakens the organization. For a supporting example see
O'Leary, supra note 15, at 115.
62 See JEFFREY HAPROP, THE PoLncAL ECONOMY OF INTEGRATION iN THE EuRoPEAN
CoMMuNrry 35 (1989).
63 When the author first conceived this study, he did not attach a lot of emphasis to the
creation of a PTA court. The lack of emphasis was informed by the experiences in the region of
previous attempts at the establishment of a regional court and the lack of commitment by the
member states to be infinitely committed to the treaties they were signing. The author was then
of the view that the most realistic solution to the problem of dispute resolution was the establish-
ment of an arbitration mechanism and a strong secretariat with a respected tribunal.
The reliance the author placed on arbitration seemed to be justified then because it would
have been possible for all member countries to pass legislation compelling the enforcement of
arbitral awards without the member states feeling that they were ceding sovereignty. But the
author is now convinced that the establishment of a regional court is indispensable because: (i) it
will create its own jurisprudence and nurture a sense of judicial discipline which is lacking in
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awareness is the elevation of the court's functions, competence and
procedural elements from protocols and statutes to the main body of
the Treaty.64 It is also a manifestation of the role of law and judicial
functions within regional integration processes in developing
countries.
65
1. Sources of COMESA Law
The COMESA Treaty does not enumerate the sources
66 of
COMESA law and their hierarchy, in the same fashion that the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice does.67 The Treaty merely
implores the COMESA Court to "ensure the adherence to law in the
interpretation and application of" the Treaty68 without defining the
law or its sources. This in itself is not necessarily a failing on the part
of the drafters as it gives the different COMESA players an opportu-
nity to develop a relevant COMESA jurisprudence free from limita-
tions in the constitutive documents. Because the PTA regime did not
have a system of law as such,69 the formulation of law within
COMESA will be a robust activity.
The primary sources of COMESA law consist of the COMESA
Treaty and its Protocols which together constitute the fons et origo of
all COMESA law. The workings of Common Market will be impaired
unless the constitutive instrument of the process, the COMESA
Treaty, is self-executing in all the Member States so that upon ratifica-
almost all the domestic jurisdictions of the member states; (ii) it will enhance the prestige of the
organization and cultivate business confidence; and ('ii) an elaborate treaty arrangement dealing
with complex issues such as tariff arrangements, anti-dumping, investment regulation, anti-trust
matters, etc., will be stultified without an equally elaborate judicial arrangement to supervise the
implementation of these arrangements and adjudicate disputes that will necessarily be engen-
dered by most of these issues, particularly given the fact that almost all of these issues are novel
to these countries and there has been no judicial or practical experience with them even at the
domestic level.
64 See PTA, supra note 33, art. 10, 21 I.LM. at 487. The only substantive reference to the
PTA Tribunal was art. 10 which merely pronounced the establishment of the Tribunal. Issues
relating to jurisdiction, procedure, etc., were later fashioned out in a Statute to the Treaty.
65 For a discussion of aversion towards lawyers and legal regimes under previous arrange-
ments, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
66 The terminology may have different connotations depending on the context. In its histori-
cal context "sources of law" refers to the creative components which give rise to the making of
the law itself. In this context, sociological, political, etc., factors may be considered as sources of
law, though they may not have any authoritative legal content. The more conventional sense
attributed to "sources of law" refers to the formal sources which are imbued with legal authority
and thus judicially cognizable.
67 International Court of Justice Statute, art. 38.
68 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 19. Similarly art. 6(g) entreats Member States to adhere to
the "recognition and observance of the rule of law."




tion it becomes law automatically within the Member States. In the
absence of such a transformation it would not be accurate to make a
distinction between primary and secondary sources of law because in
the final analysis both would have the same legal competence and
none would be superior to the other.
The most prominent secondary sources of COMESA law consist
of regulations, directives and decisions. Regulations are binding on all
the Member States in their entirety, directives are binding as to the
result to be achieved upon each Member State to which it is addressed
but not as to the means of achieving it, whereas decisions are binding
on those to whom they are addressed.70 It is expected that a majority
of suits that will be determined by the COMESA Court will involve
the legality of these secondary sources vis-a-vis the COMESA Treaty
provisions. As to the admissibility of general international law71 as a
source of law, it is submitted that the COMESA Court will utilize this
body of law to a great extent for the following two reasons.
One, in technical international business transactions among the
COMESA Member States there is hardly any "local" experience or
standards that have been set and the Court will inevitably drift to-
wards international law to find some guidance. Second, the distinc-
tions and nuances that a number of developing countries have often
tried to introduce to the understanding and appreciation of interna-
tional law do not directly relate to issues of cross border trade but
involve inter-state political relations (equality of all states, non-inter-
ference in the domestic affairs of other states, sovereignty), which is-
sues are outside the competence of the Court. In the interpretation of
the COMESA Treaty it is envisioned that the COMESA Court will
apply principles of international law recognized by the Member States
as general rules of law. However, in the event of a conflict between
an international law rule and the COMESA Treaty the former will
prevail as the latter limits the jurisdiction of the COMESA Court to
the interpretation and application of the Treaty.3
70 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 10.
71 Within the EEC, the role of international law is very limited. Advocate-General Lagrange
has stated that:
... our [European Court of justice] is not an international tribunal, but is concerned with a
community which has been created by six states and which resembles more a federation
than an international organization... The Treaty ... although concluded in the form of
international treaties and undoubtedly being one, nevertheless also constitutes, from a sub-
stantive point of view, the character of the Community and as a consequence the legal pro-
visions derived from the treaty must be viewed as the internal law of the Community.
Case 8/55 Fddration Charbonni~re de Belgique v. The High Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community, 1954-56 E.C.R. 292.
72 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 19.
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Because the provisions of the COMESA Treaty are general and
because there are no treaty provisions enumerating sources of law
within the Common Market, municipal law is bound to play a leading
role in the shaping of COMESA law. There is an immense and critical
benefit to be derived from a reliance on municipal law. If the Com-
mon Market evolves a jurisprudence that is essentially a synthesis of
general principles of municipal law of the Member States, such re-
gional law will receive the cooperation of Member States which will
enhance its esteem and applicability. Should the emerging regional
law be radically different from general legal norms of the Member
States, there is a danger that municipal law will regard such a law as
alien and unrepresentative of general principles of law. This develop-
ment could have a negative impact on the overall efficacy of law in the
region, particularly when it is considered that municipal courts are
pivotal in the operation of the Common Market.73 Municipal law is
bound to find certain application as a source of law when it comes to
the adjudication of contractual and non-contractual claims under the
Treaty which is silent on the applicable law.7'
Much attention will be focused on judicial legislation by the
COMESA Court, that is, the extent to which the Court is willing to be
activist as regards formulation of new law and supplementing treaty
provisions.75 Although there are obvious hazards that an activist
court may itself fall prey to, at the initial phase of its tenure the Court
must quickly learn to supplement treaty provisions and create a gen-
eral direction for Common Market law even in situations where no
concrete legal basis exists for such an exposition. This attitude is criti-
cal if a momentum towards stronger regional cooperation is to be
built. If the Court were to seek all answers in the COMESA instru-
ments, it would likely be unable to make affirmative declarations.
This will create uncertainty, reduce the Court's authority and stifle
regional harmony.76 Yet the Court must, at the same time, proceed
tentatively to avoid a rebellion from municipal courts which may ob-
ject to the ultra vires extension of the Courts jurisdiction.77 Clearly a
73 See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
74 See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
75 It should be noted that this can be a powerful domain for the Court because "decisions of
the Court on the interpretation of the provisions of this [COMESA] Treaty shall have prece-
dence over decisions of national courts." COMEASA supra note 52, art. 29(2). The Court can
therefore appropriate any issue, couch it in interpretative language, and exclude review by mu-
nicipal courts.
76 It is true that less precise laws expand the scope for judicial legislation.
77 It is important to note that most municipal courts within the European Community Mem-
ber States were willing to allow the European Court of Justice to roam outside its competence
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delicate balancing act will have to be undertaken and it is hoped that
the Court will quickly recognize the competing interests and play a
constructive role in equalizing them. The balancing also must be ex-
tended to competing municipal law rules which will be articulated
before it.7s Much will be expected from the Court in reconciling these
competing rules and creating a uniform Common Market law.
2. Jurisdiction of the COMESA Court of Justice
a. General Jurisdiction
The Court of Justice is listed under Article 7(1)(c) of the
COMESA Treaty79 as one of the organs of the Common Market, but
the substantive provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of
Justice and its general competence are provided for under Chapter
Five of the Treaty.80
At a general level the Court is empowered to "adjudicate upon
all matters which may be referred to it pursuant to" the COMESA
Treaty.8' There are several provisions in the Treaty which make refer-
ence to the jurisdiction of the Court in more precise terms and per-
haps the most important of these is Article 30 of the Treaty which
provides that:
1. Where a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State concerning the application or interpretation of this treaty or valid-
ity of the regulations, directives and decisions of the Common Market,
for as long as these courts felt that this was for the good of the Community. Professor Simitis
expresses this view. Spiro Simitis, Recent Developments in the EC, Address before the Forum
for the Practice of International Law, Yale Law School (April 7, 1993). However, it is also true
that there has been a growing challenge to this expanded jurisdiction as the Community legal
system becomes more self-sufficient, relying less and less on the propping up by an activist re-
gional court. Id.
78 The Member States of COMESA belong to different judicial systems and there is little
doubt that there will be competing legal philosophies before the Court.
79 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 7(c)(1).
80 Supra note 52, art. 7(c)(1).
81 COMESA, supra note 52, at art. 23. It is worth noting that the general jurisdiction of the
COMESA Court of Justice is much wider, and to some extent unexplicit, compared to, say, that
of the European Court of Justice. The latter, at art. 164, provides that "[t]he Court of Justice
shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed." Treaty
Establishing the European Community, done at Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 as
amended by the Single European Act, done at the Hague, February 17 and 28, reproduced in 25
I.L.M. 507 as amended by the Treaty on European Union and Final Act, done at Maastricht,
February 7, 1992, reproduced in 31 LLM. 247 (1992) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The Euro-
pean Community version explicitly makes reference to "interpretation" of the Treaty clearly
intimating that the general competence of the Court is limited to this area. The COMESA vari-
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such court or tribunal shall if it considers that a ruling on the question is
necessary to enable it to give judgement, request the Court to give a
preliminary ruling thereon.
2. Where any question as that referred to in paragraph I of this Article
is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State
against whose judgement there is no judicial remedy under the national
law of that Member State, that court or tribunal shall refer the matter to
the Court.82
This provision is modelled on Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome 3
both in wording and substance.84 The clear import of the provision is
to ensure that a legal monopoly in the application of the COMESA
Treaty is created in favor of the Court of Justice. That notwithstand-
ing, it is important to recognize that this jurisdiction is clearly limited
to the interpretation, and not application,85 of the COMESA Treaty 6
and other legal instruments created under it. Hence the word "inter-
pretation" becomes the most critical in the whole legal structure of
COMESA.87
By specifically guaranteeing that this "interpretative" compe-
tence is reserved 88 to the Court of Justice, the COMESA Treaty89 has
averted the reproduction of heretic decisions such as Okunda v. Re-
public.90 Unlike in the past, there will be no parallel judicial systems
82 COMESA, supra note 52, art 30.
83 See COMESA, supra note 52, art. 177.
84 For a further discussion see generally Ami Barav, The Judicial Power of the European
Economic Community, 53 S. CAr- L. Rlv. 461 (1980).
85 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 30.
86 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 30. It may, however, be said that the interpretative regime
of the European Court of Justice, and this may be an academic preoccupation, is Wider than that
of COMESA in as far as the former speaks of "interpretations of acts of the institutions of the
Community" whereas the latter only considers the "interpretation" of the Treaty "or validity of
the regulations, directives and decisions of the Common Market." In construing these provisions
it is possible to argue that under the European Community any factor that flows from the opera-
tion of the Community gives the European Court of Justice jurisdiction. This argument can also
be advanced for the COMESA Court of Justice.
87 The same is true of the European Community's legal regime in that the European Court
of Justice's competence extends only to interpretation of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 92, and
its related instruments. For a discussion of this competence in the European Community con-
text, see Francis Jacobs, When To Refer to the European Court; 90 L.Q. Rnv. 486 (1974). See also
Joseph Weilee, Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant, 21 J.
COMM. MKir. Sn. 39,55 (1982).
88 Indeed art. 34(1) of COMESA creates a monopoly in this regard by providing that "[a]ny
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty or any of the matters referred
to the Court pursuant to this Chapter shall not be subjected to any method of settlement other
than those provided for in this Treaty." COMESA, supra note 52, art. 34(1).
89 Id-
90 1970 E. Afr. L. Rep. 453 (Kenya) where the East African Court of Appeals held that the
Kenyan Constitution superseded the East African Community Treaty and in cases of inconsis-
tency the former will override the latter.
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under the new COMESA legal regime. A unitary system will thus be
created in which both national courts and the Court of Justice act
jointly in the effectuation of the Treaty provisions.91 At a technical
level direct applicability of COMESA law has been achieved. None-
theless, Member States must first ensure that national laws, and in
particular national constitutions,92 recognize this new dynamic by
making it impossible to plead a higher national law within a national
jurisdiction to defeat a Treaty provision.93 In other words there must
be a constitutionalization of the Treaty within all the Member States.94
In the absence of such a transformation, cases will still exist where
national courts refuse to honor regional agreements because national
law does not allow it.95 To achieve this synchronization the compe-
tence of both national law and regional law must be clearly delimited
and each must recognize when to yield to the other.9 6 Returning to
91 For a discussion of the COMESA Court's jurisdiction with reference to preliminary rul-
ings, see infra notes 249-264 and accompanying text.
92 When acceding to the European Community, the Danes had to amend their constitution
and provide that "[t]he provisions of [the Treaties establishing the Communities, etc.] shall take
effect in Denmark to the extent that they are directly applicable in Denmark under Community
Law." Den. Const. sec. 3(1). See also Due & Gulmann, Constitutional Implications of the Dan-
ish Accession to the European Communities, 9 Comm. MKT. L. REv. 256 (1972). Similarly, the
Irish amended their constitution to provide that "[n]o provision of the Constitution invalidates
laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of
membership of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by
the Communities, or institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the State." Ir. Const.
art. 29. See also Lang, Legal and Constitutional Implications for Ireland of Adhesion to the EEC
Treaty, 9 Comm. MKcT. L. REv. 167 (1972).
93 It cannot be said that the COMESA arrangement has reached a stage where it is possible
to state that "any rule of law inconsistent with directly applicable provisions of the Treaty is
impliedly repealed by enactment of the Treaty." JomN TEMPLE LANG, Tim COMMON MARKET
AND COMMON LAWy LEGAL ASPEcrs OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
STim EuROPEAN COMMUNrIY, WrrH IRELAND AS A PROTOTYPE, 32 (1966).
94 Mere incorporation or adoption of the Treaty as part of domestic law will not suffice in
this case for such devices do not qualitatively assure the eminence that the Treaty envisages. See
generally Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J.
INT'' L. I1, 10-14 (1981).
95 A situation similar to that ensued following the invalidation of the ANDEAN Investment
Code by the Colombian Supreme Court. Derecho De La Inegracio, supra note 60. In that case
Colombia, notwithstanding the decision of its Supreme Court, was legally bound by its interna-
tional obligations. The end result is that you have a valid international obligation which is inva-
lid within the domestic arena of the obligant. See also John Pate, Introductory Note, 11 I.L.M.
574 (1972). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regarding the validity of treaties
stipulates that the act of state doctrine does not invalidate the legal effect of treaties. Arts. 27
and 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
96 With regard to this point and with specific reference to the European Community, Ami
Barav concludes that "[n]ational courts should give precedence to community law because of its
(Community law) inherent nature..." Ami Barav, supra note 84, at 501.
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the domestic federal analogy used above,97 just as the various federal
units must be sure how competent each federal institution is and how
much residual power has been left to each federal unit, so too must a
regional legal system indulge in this categorization.
The conflict between national law and regional law is one that
attends all regional arrangements in particular and international law
in general. COMESA does not appear to have anticipated the inten-
sity of this conflict. Had COMESA seriously thought of the gravity of
the matter, it would have provided for a supremacy clause in the
Treaty that would have made conflict between national law and re-
gional law superfluous. Supremacy could have been provided by
either declaring that the COMESA Court of Justice have the sole ju-
risdiction to interpret COMESA, as the COMESA Treaty has done,
or more importantly stipulating that in the event that there is a con-
flict between COMESA law and any national law, COMESA law shall
prevail.98 The latter option is the most authoritative means of assur-
ing supremacy. 99 Because of this omission the Court will have to be
activist in ordaining its supremacy much in the same vein as the Euro-
pean Court of Justice has done.1°° The danger of adopting such a
course of action to guarantee jurisdictional supremacy is that it can
only work with the express acquiesence of national courts, which can-
not be assured.1°1
97 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
98 For those countries that accord a primary position to international law, such as the
Netherlands, this supremacy is guaranteed without the need for further statutory amendments to
the constitution or other legislation. The Netherlands' constitution provides that courts may not
pass on the conformity of treaties to the constitution which means that courts are obliged to
apply treaties even if they are inconsistent with the constitution. Neth. Const. art. 60, para. 3.
This is also true in France, Belgium and Luxembourg. See Michel Waelbroeck, The Application
of EEC Law by National Courts, 19 STAN. L. Rnv. 1248 (1967). In these countries, anterior as
well as posterior national laws which are inconsistent with treaty provisions become invalid. See
Dennis Thompson & S. Marsh Norman, The United Kingdom and the Treaty of Rome: Some
Preliminary Observations, 11 INT'L & Com. L.Q. 73,74 (1962). A disclaimer, as Thompson &
Norman have pointed out, needs to be proffered in that even where a constitution gives interna-
tional law a primary position, unless national courts have the power of judicial review, this
supremacy loses much of its efficacy. France is a good example. Thompson & Norman, id. See
also Roger Clark, Legal Principles of Non-Socialist Economic Integration as Exemplified by the
European Economic Community, 8 SYRAcusE J. IN'rL L. & CoM. 1, 21 (1980).
99 See Green, supra note 59.
100 See Barav, supra note 84, at 499. Barav states that "in the absence of a supremacy clause
in the Treaty, supremacy has been forcefully and persuasively proclaimed by the Court." Barav,
supra note 84, at 499.
101 Within the European Community, there are increasing signs of irritation at the lack of a
formal legal regime guaranteeing supremacy of European Community law. Until now, national
courts have extended deference to the European Court of Justice in situations where European
Comunity law was in conflict with national law, hoping that this would subsequently be regu-
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Within the general framework of the subject of the place of inter-
national law within domestic jurisprudence, a facet that is worth not-
ing is the implication of any concretization, in constitutional form, of
superiority of international law over national law. With special refer-
ence to developing countries, will such an opening let in such contro-
versial (according to the rhetoric of many developing countries)
instruments as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights10 2
and other related international instruments? It will be interesting to
see whether Member States of the COMESA arrangement will seek
to restrict their constitutional amendments to import the COMESA
Treaty specifically and, by the same token, exclude other international
instruments.
One area in which the jurisdiction of the Court seems to be cir-
cumscribed is in its competence to order compliance of treaty provi-
sions and undertakings. Unlike the Treaty of Rome'0 3 which
specifically empowers the European Court to require a defaulting
Member State "to take the necessary measures to comply with the
judgement of the Court of justice" 04 the COMESA Treaty provision
on this seems to be permissive rather than mandatory.10 5 This seems
to be indicative of the reluctance by Member States to submit totally
to the jurisdiction of the Court. A similar apprehension was also ex-
hibited during negotiation of Article 25 of the COMESA Treaty. This
provision requires that the Secretary-General, in dealing with a Mem-
ber State which has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty, shall
submit his findings to the offending State for its observations on the
findings.1' 6 Should the Member State fail to submit its observations to
the Secretary-General within two months or should the observations
submitted be unsatisfactory, the Secretary-General shall refer the
matter to the "Bureau of the Council which shall decide whether the
matter shall be referred by the Secretary-General to the Court imme-
larised by a formal treaty provision. Because this regularization has not been forthcoming, na-
tional courts are beginning to express displeasure at this state of affairs and supremacy of
European Community law may begin to be challenged. See Simitis, supra note 77.
102 December 10, 1948, U.N.G.A. Res. 217 (HI 1948).
103 Treaty of Rome, supra note 81.
104 See supra note 81, art. 171(1).
105 See COMESA, supra note 52, art 34(3), which provides that "[a] Member State[s], the
Authority or the Council shall take, without delay, the measures required to implement a judge-
ment of the Court. Although the word "shall" is used here, the inference to be drawn from the
general context of the article seems to suggest that the Court has no powers to order compliance
but the defaulting Member States are being asked to honor the decisions of the Court.
106 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 25(1).
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diately or be referred to the Council."'1 7 The inclusion of this provi-
sion was only possible after the meeting of the Ministers of Justice and
Attorneys-General of the Member States.10 8 The various delegations
charged with the drafting of the Treaty were unable to agree on this
issue.109 Notwithstanding the new-found resolve to ensure that com-
prehensive structures are erected, Member States are still uncertain
about the appropriate extent of the Court's powers.1 0 As the above
negotiations indicate, there are some Member States that feel a grant
of compulsive judicial power to the Court will lead to their own loss of
power and influence.
Another area in which the jurisdiction of the Court is, at the least,
hazy is the competence of the Court to interpret and pass a ruling on
the statutes governing other institutions of COMESA. This ambiguity
is generated by Article 30 of the COMESA Treaty which refers to the
"interpretation of this Treaty or validity of the regulations, directives
and decisions of the Common Market... ."' A literal construction
would exclude the interpretation of instruments governing institutions
of the Common Market, for example the Re-insurance Company, the
Clearing House, etc."' This omission is, in the view of the writer, so
profound that an urgent amendment to the Treaty is imperative.
Although it can be argued that the Treaty recognizes these institutions
and therefore the Court has jurisdiction to interpret Charters creating
them, the issue of jurisdiction is not one that can be inferred especially
107 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 25(2).
108 Held in Lusaka, Zambia on Oct. 30, 1993.
109 See Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Draft
Treaty No. 6, 1993, (on file with the PTA Secretariat, Lusaka, Zambia).
110 It is interesting to note that art. 25(2) of Draft Treaty No. 6 of the Treaty provided that
"[i]f a Member State concerned does not submit its observations to the Secretary-General within
two months, or if the observations submitted are unsatisfactory, the Secretary-General may refer
the matter to the Court." id.
The final Treaty was at pains to block this direct access to the Court in favor of a longer
path. This circumlocution was concretized by the addition of art. 25(3), which was introduced in
Draft Treaty No. 7 of the Treaty, 1993, which provided that "[w]here a matter has been referred
to the Council under the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article and the Council fails to resolve
the matter, the Council shall direct the Secretary-General to refer the matter to the Court."
Member States were uneasy with the idea that Secretary-General on his own motion could bring
a defaulting Member State to Court.
Ill COMESA, supra note 52, art. 30(1). Similarly, art. 26 of COMESA empowers legal and
natural persons to challenge the "legality of any act, regulation, directive, or decision of the
Authority or the Council or of a Member State of which he is a resident..."
112 This construction would seem to be supported by the phrasing of the European Commu-
nity equivalent of this provision. The Treaty of Rome speaks of the "validity and interpretation
of acts of the institutions of the Community" and the "interpretation of the statutes of bodies




where the Articles enunciating this jurisdiction are clear and unambig-
uous. The rule of construction expresio unius est exclusio alterius is
conclusive on this issue.
1 3
Article 174(1) of the COMESA Treaty provides that "[t]he Mem-
ber States shall recognize the institutions established under the prefer-
ential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States which shall
continue to be regulated by the respective Charters establishing
them.""' 4 Article 174(3) further states that "[u]pon entry into force of
this Treaty, the institutions specified in paragraph 2 (which lists all the
institutions) of this Article shall be deemed to be institutions of the
Common Market and shall be designated as such." However, "institu-
tions" are not defined in the Treaty and their competence is not pro-
vided for. 15 The only relevant reference to "institutions" is to be
found in Article 175 which provides at paragraph one that "[e]ach in-
stitution of the Common Market shall, in the implementation of the
provisions of its Charter take into account the objectives, policies,
programmes and activities of the Common Market." Because Article
30 of the COMESA Treaty gives jurisdiction to the Court to investi-
gate the validity of acts done by the Council, Authority and Member
States,1 6 it is relevant to examine the connection between these or-
gans and the institutions. Here again there is no nexus on which the
Court can rely to assume jurisdiction over the institutions of the Com-
mon Market. The closest link is through Article 9(3) which provides
that "[s]ubject to the provisions of this Treaty, the regulations, direc-
tives and decisions of the Council taken or given in pursuance of this
Treaty shall be binding on the Member States, on all subordinate or-
gans of the Common Market other than the Court. .. ." But even
here "subordinate organs" would not include institutions especially
when it is considered that the Court in this particular provision is con-
templated as a "subordinate organ." The chapter dealing with the
COMESA Authority has a similar provision."
7
113 The rule commands that "mention of one or more things of a particular class may be
regarded as silently excluding all other members of the class: expressum facit cessare taciturn."
MAXWEL. ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATuTEs 293 (12th ed. 1969). The rule has also been
interpreted to mean that "express enactment shuts the door to further implication." Whiteman
v. Sadler 1910 App. Cas. 514, 527, Lord Dunedin.
114 COMESA, supra note 52.
115 It is also instructive that art. 7 of COMESA, supra note 52, which lists all the organs of
the Common Market, does not include "institutions."
116 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 7.
117 Article 8(3) of COMESA provides that "[s]ubject to the provisions of this Treaty, the
directions and decisions of the Authority taken or given in pursuance of the provisions of this
Treaty, shall as the case may be, be binding on the Member States and on all other organs of the
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Returning to Article 175 there is evidence to support the conclu-
sion that institutions of COMESA are somewhat removed from the
strict purview of the COMESA Treaty and are, in actual fact, autono-
mous entities. In particular, Article 175(2) provides that "[t]he Secre-
tary-General shall maintain such continuous working relations with
the institutions of the Common Market as would further the imple-
mentation of the provisions of this treaty and shall for this purpose
make co-operation arrangements with each institution of the Com-
mon Market." The aspect of autonomy is derived from the fact that
"co-operation arrangements" would be superfluous in a situation
where the institutions are part and parcel of the COMESA Treaty
arrangement.
A further indicator that lends credence to the lack of jurisdiction
of the Court to interpret Charters of COMESA institutions is found in
the former PTA Treaty.118 The PTA Treaty at article 5(1) provides
that "[t]he institutions of the Preferential Trade Area shall be- (a) the
Authority, (b) the Council of Ministers, (c) the Secretariat, (d) the
Tribunal, and (e) the Commission, the Committees and such other
technical and specialized bodies as may be established or provided for
by this Treaty."'1 9 The PTA regime brought all establishments of the
PTA under its umbrella. A look at the COMESA Treaty 20 will show
that it does not utilize the term "institution" but instead prefers to
speak of "organs."'' This nomenclatural variation is not of real con-
sequence' 22 but in terms of effectively bringing COMESA institutions
Common Market other than the Court .... COMESA, supra note 52, art. 8(3). The only
difference between this provision and art. 9(3) is that it speaks of "organs" rather than
"subordinate organs." This is confusing because in both provisions the Court is exempted,
meaning that the Court is both an "organ" and a "subordinate organ."
118 PTA, supra note 33.
119 PTA, supra note 33, art. 5(1).
120 COMESA, supra note 52.
121 Article 7(1) of COMESA provides that "[t]here shall be established as organs of the Com-
mon Market: (a) the Authority, (b) the Council, (c) the Court of Justice, (d) the Committee of
Governors of Central Banks, (e) the Intergovernmental Committee, (f) the Technical Commit-
tees, (g) the Secretariat, and (h) the Consultative Committee." COMESA, supra note 52, art.
7(1).
122 This is so because bodies such as the Authority, Council and Secretariat which were
termed "institutions" under the PTA regime are reproduced in COMESA but listed this time as
"organs." Because there is no qualitative change in the functions of these bodies, it can rightly
be assumed that the change of terminology was not intended to import a new dimension or
meaning.
However, the COMESA regime imports some confusion because it utilizes both terms. The
Authority, Council, Secretariat, etc., are referred to as "organs" but the Clearing House, the Re-
insurance Company, the Centre for Commercial Arbitration, etc., are referred to as "institu-
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within the strict ambit of the COMESA Treaty in general and the
Court's jurisdiction in particular, there are serious misgivings.
This difficulty was apparently detected during the negotiation of
the Treaty.12 The solution that was then prescribed was the incorpo-
ration of Article 174(3) which provides that "[u]pon entry into force
of this Treaty, the institutions specified in paragraph 2 of this Article
shall be deemed to be institutions of the Common Market and shall be
designated as such." With all due respect to the drafters of the Treaty,
this was no solution. It is as if the drafters were working backwards,
so to speak, to give jurisdiction to the Court. First, by declaring these
entities "institutions" of the Common Market, the drafters forgot to
define institutions and the relationship these institutions had with the
organs of the Common Market. 124 Second, even if this relationship
were set out, jurisdiction is not inferred, but is conferred. There
seems to have been a misconception'2 5 that bringing the institutions of
the Common Market within the regime of the COMESA Treaty
would automatically include the Charters of these institutions in the
COMESA Treaty.
Because Chapter Five of the COMESA Treaty, which sets out the
operations of the Court, does not stipulate that the Court has jurisdic-
tion to interpret the Charters of these institutions, the Court cannot
infer jurisdiction when its jurisdiction has been expressly stated.2 6
The drafters of the Treaty should have adopted a forward approach by
providing that the Court will have jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty
together with Charters of institutions of the Common Market. Be-
cause COMESA institutions cannot be brought, directly or impliedly,
within the ambit of either the COMESA Council or Authority, the
Court neither possesses the jurisdictional authority to interpret their
tions." It is possible that the drafters of COMESA did not attach importance to this issue.
COMESA, supra note 52, art. 7(1).
123 Interview with Dan Ameyo, Senior State Council at the Attorney-General's Chambers, in
Nairobi, Kenya (Feb. 21,1994). According to Mr. Ameyo, the drafters wanted the Court to have
jurisdiction to interpret the Charters of the various COMESA institutions.
124 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 8(3) and art. 175.
125 It is a misconception because a quick perusal of the Treaty of Rome indicates that there is
a distinction. Art. 177(a) gives the European Court of Justice jurisdiction in "the interpretation
of this Treaty" and paragraph (c) gives the same court jurisdiction in "the interpretation of the
statutes of bodies established by an act of Council, where those statutes provide." Treaty of
Rome, supra note 81, art. 177(a). The fact that these bodies are created by acts of the Council
and which acts are clearly within the scrutiny of the Court does not mean that their statutes are
part of the Treaty of Rome.
126 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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Charters nor their application. 127 This is a significant exclusion partic-
ularly when it is considered that COMESA institutions have a direct
and powerful impact on the integration process. This will be one of
the contentious issues with which the Court will have to deal.
b. The Question of Locus Standi
It is possible to argue that the weightiest factor that inhibited the
effectiveness of the PTA Treaty 2 8 and which has, as a consequence,
received serious treatment in the COMESA Treaty is that of locus
standi. Under the PTA regime only Member States had the right to
challenge the interpretation and application of the Treaty,'12 9 a situa-
tion which in essence made dispute resolution mechanisms under the
Treaty unavailable to the most important players in the arrange-
ment.' 30  In its attempts to create a more robust system of dispute
settlement, the COMESA Treaty has, however, failed to address ade-
quately the question of locus standi. Access to the COMESA Court
has been provided for generally but numerous grey areas and incon-
sistent provisions exist. Unfortunately, because locus standi is crucial
in the enforcement of Treaty provisions, these ambiguous and incon-
127 There would appear to be quirky exception to the foregoing. In art. 27(2) of COMESA,
supra note 52, the Court is granted "jurisdiction to determine claims by any person against the
Common Market or its institutions for acts of their servants or employees in the performance of
their duties." The extent of this jurisdiction, whether it includes contractual liabilities or tort-
based actions, will be discussed below, infra notes 167-168 and accompanying text. Regardless, it
is clear that the Court's jurisdiction is only limited to the determination of infringements by the
servants or employees of these institutions. These servants or employees are subjected to the
scrutiny of their actions which might cause harm to other parties, but the instruments that regu-
late their conduct are outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
The provision becomes inoperative when it is considered that for "claims" to be legally
cognizable the actions giving rise to them must ipso facto be infringements of the instruments
that govern the operations of these institutions. In other words, the actions must be ultra vires
these instruments or exes de pouvior under the French empirical classification. See HAMSON,
ExEcurrw DIscRETIoN AND JUDICIAL CoNTRoL-AN AsPEcr OF ThE FnaNcI CONSEIL
D'ETAT (1954) 165. An ultra vires determination, perforce, flows from the interpretation of
instruments. And because the Court has no jurisdiction to interpret these instruments, actions
cannot lie against the institutions.
Of course it may be argued that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Charters of
Common Market institutions only to the extent of recognizing claims brought under art. 27(2)
and nothing more. This would, however, import an absurdity to the extent that acts of employ-
ees of these institutions may result in claims against the institutions concerned but would other-
wise remain legal and binding. In other words a holding by the Court under art. 27(2) would not
have a res judicata effect in respect to other parties in that a finding by the court that a "wrong"
has been committed does not annul the offending provision or act.
128 PTA, supra note 33.
129 PTA, supra note 33, at art. 40; 21 I.L.M. at 495.
130 Individuals and other non-State players, who were the major trade participants were de-
nied access to the PTA Tribunal.
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sistent provisions will be exaggerated. The question of locus precedes
all litigation and unless the legal regime provides a prima facie touch-
stone for its determination, many legal controversies will be gener-
ated. There are three basic components when considering the issue of
locus within a regional grouping: the right of Member States to sue
legal persons, natural persons and regional institutions.
Within COMESA, Member States do not have to satisfy any par-
ticular requirements of standing to sue, at least in the sense that the
principle of locus standi is understood in administrative law.13 ' Arti-
cle 24(1) of the COMESA Treaty provides that "[a] Member State
which considers that another Member State or the Authority or the
Council has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty or has in-
fringed a provision of this Treaty, may refer the matter to the
Court."' 32 The same is true in cases of Member States requesting ad-
visory opinions133 or choosing to intervene' 34 in any case which is al-
ready before the Court. Indeed Member States within COMESA
have a wider access to the Court than European Community Member
States have to the European Court of Justice. The latter may not in-
stitute a claim before bringing the matter before the Commission.
135
There are, therefore, no impediments placed on the ability of a Mem-
ber State to prosecute a case before the Court136 with the exception
131 Under English administrative law, the "[ljaw starts from the position that remedies are
correlative with rights, and that only those whose own rights are at stake are eligible to be
awarded remedies." H.W.R. WADE, AnmmitsRATwE LAW 688 (1988). See also P. VAN DUK,
JunIciAL REVIEW OF GoVERNm:ENTAL AcrioN AND THE REoUiREMENT OF INTEREST TO SuE
(1980).
In French administrative law the "plaintiff must be able to show that the decision attacked is
one injurious (faisant grief) to his interests." NEvn.tE BROWN & JonN F. GARNER, FRENcH
ADMn sTRATrVE LAW 81 (1967).
132 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 24(1).
133 Art. 32(1) of COMESA, provides that "The Authority, the Council or a Member State
may request the Court to give an advisory opinion regarding questions of law arising from the
provisions of this Treaty affecting the Common Market, and the Member State shall in the case
of every such request have the right to be represented and take part in the proceedings."
COMESA, supra note 52, art. 32(1).
134 Under art. 36 of COMESA, "[a] Member State, the Secretary-General or a resident of a
Member State who is not a party to a case before the Court may with leave of the Court, inter-
vene in that case .. " COMESA, supra note 52, art. 36.
135 Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art. 170. The provision states that "[b]efore a Member
State brings an action against another Member State for an alleged infringement of an obligation
under this Treaty, it shall bring the matter before the Commission." Member States may, how-
ever, proceed to execute their claims before the Court if the Commission does not deliver an
opinion within three months of being seized of the matter. Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art.
170.
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that the claim must be based upon a recognized ground in the
Treaty.
137
Access to the Court by legal and natural persons is limited, and
rather confused, as compared to that of Member States. 38 For legal
and natural persons, the understanding of locus standi still does not
approximate its understanding under administrative law generally.
139
The Treaty provision that can be said to represent the general extent
of the standing legal and natural persons have within COMESA is
Article 26 of the COMESA Treaty which declares that "[a]ny person
who is resident in a Member State may refer for determination by the
Court the legality of any act, regulation, directive, or decision of the
Authority or the Council or a Member State of which he is a resi-
dent...." 140 However, before such person can activate this clause, a
proviso has been included which mandates that that person must have
first exhausted local remedies.' 4 This is where confusion arises. If
such a person were to take the matter first to a national tribunal or
court for determination, such tribunal or court, if the matter touches
on the interpretation of the COMESA Treaty (and it must certainly be
on interpretation of the Treaty because COMESA Court's jurisdiction
only extends to this) must refer the matter to the Court under Article
30 of the Treaty. 42 It follows that a legal person has no standing to
bring a claim to the Court and that Article 26 is an embarrassing case
of bad drafting. 43 In any case, even if legal persons can be said to
have access to the Court by virtue of Article 26 what would be the
nature of the claim? If local remedies must first be pursued is the
suggestion here that if a legal person is dissatisfied with the ruling of a
local court or tribunal such person can appeal to the COMESA
137 Grounds of review are provided in art. 24(2). See infra notes 170-199 and accompanying
text.
138 Throughout the COMESA Treaty, supra note 52, and this is true also with regard to the
Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, it is presumed that the term "natural and legal person" necessar-
ily refers to individuals, enterprises and associations. However, it is a fact that Member States
and COMESA are legal persons. For a similar view, see D.G. VALmniz, Trm COURT OF Jus-
TICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES VOL 1,299 (1965).
139 See supra note 131.
140 COMESA, supra note 52.
141 The proviso states that "[pirovided that where the matter for determination relates to any
act, regulation, directive or decision by such a Member State, such person shall not refer the
matter for determination under this Article unless he has first exhausted local remedies in the
national courts of the Member State." COMESA, supra note 52, art. 26.
142 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 26.
143 The simple point to be made here is that there can be no local remedy for an infringement
of COMESA law. Once any of the breaches contemplated by art. 26 of COMESA crystallizes,
the only organ that can competently adjudicate the issues and provide a remedy is the COMESA




Court? If the drafters of the Treaty intended such a consequence it
would clearly conflict with the overall competence of the Court. As
stated earlier, the COMESA Court was intended to have a monopoly
in the interpretation and application of the COMESA Treaty.144 An
appeal from a local court or tribunal presupposes that such local court
or tribunal has the competence to interpret the Treaty, a possibility
that the Treaty does not recognize. 145 The logical position is that
within COMESA legal persons have no access to the COMESA Court
notwithstanding a contrary indication in the Treaty.
The Treaty of Rome"46 guarantees legal persons access to the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice "against a decision addressed to that person
or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a
decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual con-
cern to the former." 47 It can be seen that as far as the issue of locus
standi in respect of legal persons is concerned, the European Commu-
nity adopts a rigid148 stance and the concept is applied in a fashion
similar to that in administrative law.149 Access by legal persons is lim-
ited to reduce the pool of potential litigants to a manageable size.
Within COMESA, and if Article 26 of the COMESA Treaty were as-
sumed to have any legal effect, all residents of COMESA Member
States potentially have access to the Court on any issue touching on
the interpretation of the COMESA Treaty,150 a prospect that must
surely be frightening for the COMESA Court. There is an urgent
need for COMESA to reformulate the issue of locus standi to ensure
that legal persons have access and that this access is exercised within
reasonable and workable parameters.
Staying with the issue of legal persons and their competence to
sue before the COMESA Court, an interesting issue is the extent, if
144 Supra note 88 and accompanying text.
145 By way of an example, might a private litigant who complains that the COMESA Council
in pronouncing a regulation has acted ultra vires or has committed an abuse of power, have the
possibility of receiving a local remedy against the COMESA Council? It is not conceivable that
COMESA contemplated such a consequence.
146 Treaty of Rome, supra note 81.
147 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art. 173. In Plaumann & Co. v. EEC Commission
[1964] C.M.L.R. 29, at 47, the European Court of Justice stated that:
Persons other than those to whom the decision was addressed can justifiably claim to be
concerned individually only if the decision affects them because of certain characteristics
which are peculiar to them or by reason of factual situation which is, as compared with all
other persons, peculiarly relevant to them, and by reference to which they may be individu-
ally described in a way similar to that of the addressee of the decision.
148 See, e.g., Plaumann & Co. v. Commission [1964] C.M.L.R. Alfred Toepfer KG & Ge-
treide-Importgeselischaft mbH v. Commission [1966] C.M.L.R. 111.
149 See supra note 131.
150 COMESA, supra note 52.
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any, to which tort claims instituted by third parties against the Com-
mon Market and its institutions can be entertained by the Court.
Under Article 27(2) of the COMESA Treaty the Court has "jurisdic-
tion to determine claims by any person against the Common Market
or its institutions for acts of their servants or employees in the per-
formance of their duties."'' This provision raises four pertinent
issues.
One, does "any person" mean that individuals can have direct
access to the Court or must such persons still have to qualify under
Article 26 which mandates the exhaustion of local remedies? It would
appear that since all legal and natural persons have to exhaust local
remedies before instituting their claims before the Court (to establish
locus standi), this requirement would still have to be satisfied by those
wishing to file claims under article 27(2). However, this would result
in an absurd situation in which national courts and tribunals will be
required to interpret the COMESA Treaty and instruments creating
COMESA institutions, identify the violation and award damages.
Quite clearly, national courts and tribunals cannot have this compe-
tence.152 Even if a claim were to be initiated through local courts or
tribunals this is not a matter of interpretation which is contemplated
by Article 30 of the COMESA Treaty. Rather it is a substantive case
in which the Court acts as a court of first instance, takes evidence and
makes an award. 3 It is, therefore, more realistic to infer that under
Article 27(2) the drafters envisaged a direct access to the Court with-
out the necessity of going through local courts or tribunals.154 Be-
151 COMESA, supra note 52.
152 COMESA, supra note 52.
153 The European Court of Justice has had a long history of dealing with matters of first
instance and a recent revision of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 81 art. 168a, has created a Court
of Fast Instance by providing that:
The Court of First Instance shall be attached to the Court of Justice with the jurisdiction to
hear and determine at first instance, subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on
points of law only and in accordance with the conditions laid down by the Statute, certain
classes of action or proceeding defined in accordance with the conditions laid down in para-
graph 2.
For a discussion of the operations of the Court see TW~O=-s¢ MILET, THE COURT OF FiRsT
INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN CoMuNrrIs (1990).
154 To be sure, it is possible for a claimant to pursue a local remedy for breach of a Treaty
provision by his or her government. In this case the claimant can claim that his or her govern-
ment has misapplied a Treaty provision which has resulted in some damage to the claimant. The
same set of facts can, simultaneously, be sufficient to prosecute a claim against the Common
Market. Whether an individual can challenge his Member State's act will depend on national
law, and in particular, whether the Treaty is superior to other laws. See Walter van Gerven, The
Legal Protection of Private Parties in the Law of the European Economic Community, in EURO-




cause of the above complication it is better to infer that the intention
was to provide the COMESA Court with sole jurisdiction for actions
brought under this section.' 5 The requirement of the exhaustion of
local remedies156 would, therefore, seem to be restricted to the nullifi-
cation of acts of the Authority, Council or Member State in which a
claim in damages is not being pursued.
Two, what is the legal extent of "claims" under this provision? In
the absence of further elaboration and applying a literal interpreta-
tion, "claims" would undoubtedly include both contractual and non-
contractual (tortious) claims. A further question that arises is if tort
claims can be sustained what is the nature of the tort law that the
Court is supposed to apply.'57 The Treaty is unhelpful in this regard
and it is debatable whether the Court can entertain a tort-based claim
in the absence of a provision that lays down the law to be applied.
158
It becomes clear that the COMESA Treaty is underdeveloped in its
formulation and execution of causes of action and because of this defi-
ciency, the Court will have to model fresh jurisprudence to enable the
effectuation of claims or dismiss these claims as non-justiciable under
the present provisions of the Treaty.
Three, uncertainty exists as to the import of the phrase "acts of
their servants or employees in the performance of their duties."' 59 In
order to understand this uncertainty, knowledge of the distinction
known to French law as that between faute de service and faute per-
sonnelle is essential. In French law, a faute de service refers to the
155 The Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art. 178, provides that "The Court of Justice shall have
jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation for damage provided for in the second para-
graph of Article 215." This has been interpreted as giving the Court of Justice sole jurisdiction.
See van Gerven, supra note 154, at 10.
156 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 26.
157 The same can be said of contractual liability that may be prosecuted under this head.
Although in respect of contractual liability the dilemma is not as big because usually the law to
be applied will be the law governing the contract. Ordinarily, conflict of law rules are fairly
elaborate in this regard. Nonetheless, it would have been helpful for the drafters of the Treaty to
have made an express provision for the applicable law. The Treaty of Rome stipulates at art. 215
that the European Court of Justice "shall be governed by the law applicable to the contract in
question." Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art. 215.
158 Compare this position with that obtaining in the European Community where the Treaty
of Rome provides that in determining tort-based claims the European Court of Justice shall be
guided by "the general principles common to the law of the Member States .. " Treaty of
Rome, supra note 81. It would also be interesting to note that within the European Community
an individual may institute a tort-based action in respect to a normative act, a normative act
being described as that "which implies the existence of certain alternatives as regards economic
policy." Case 5171 Atkien-Zuckerfabrik Schoppenstedt v. Council of the European Communi-
ties, 1971 E.C.R. 975.
159 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 27(2).
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occurrence where damage results from the malfunction of an institu-
tion or the institution's servants160 whereas faute personnelle refers to
that situation in which damage is caused by some personal wrongdo-
ing on the part an institution's servant which is in no way connected
with that servant's official position.' 6 ' In a faute de service instance,
the institution is liable, whereas the individual servant is personally
liable in the case of faute personnelle.'62 The European Community
adopts this classification in adjudicating tort-based claims. 63 English
law does recognize this distinction, albeit in a cruder fashion, by ac-
knowledging the distinction between a servant acting in the course of
his employment and one who is on a frolic of his own.164 In the for-
mer case the master/employer is liable, whilst in the latter, the servant
assumes sole responsibility. Reverting to Article 27(2) of the
COMESA Treaty165 the complication arises because of a strange
omission in the provision. Because the provision states that liability
shall attach on the Common Market or its institutions "for acts of
their servants or employees in the performance of their duties" a
question arises as to the liability of the Common Market or its institu-
tions in respect to collective acts of the Common Market, its institu-
tions or organs/bodies of the Common Market. Would a decision of
the board of the Re-insurance Company, an institution of the Com-
mon Market, be an act of the "servants or employees" of the Common
Market or its institutions or would such an act be categorized as an act
of that collective body? The same can be asked of a decision or act of
the COMESA Authority or Council; would such decision or act be
one by "servants or employees" of the Common Market?
It seems that under the COMESA Treaty, liability will attach only
if the wrong is committed by servants or employees in individual ca-
pacities. No liability will attach if an act has been ordained by a col-
lectivity of the Common Market or any of its institutions. It is useful
to note in this regard that the European Community equivalent of this
provision provides that liability will accrue for "damage caused by its
(Community's) institutions or by its servants in the performance of
their duties.' 66 In the European Community version, collective acts
160 See L. BROWN & JoHN GARNER, FRENcH ADMIIsTRATrVE LAw 99 et seq. (1973).
161 Id.
162 I.
163 See e.g., Joined Cases 5,7 & 13-24/66, Kampffmeyer v. EEC Commission 1967 E.C.R. 245.
164 See W.V.H. ROGERS, WnFmLD & JOLOWICZ ON ToRT 205 et seq. (1994).
165 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 27(2).
166 Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art. 215.
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or decisions of organs of the Community can be cited for purposes of
obtaining a remedy for a faute de service infringement.
Four, in order to sustain a "claim" must a litigant first establish a
breach of a duty of care, 67 in the case of tort-based, and privity of
contract, 16 in contractual claims? It would seem obvious that a claim-
ant must, perforce, establish that he or she has suffered damage which
damage was occasioned by "servants or employees" of the Common
Market in the execution of their duties. But in the absence of an af-
firmative declaration to that effect, a claimant may be able to sue for a
breach which does not result in direct injury to the particular claimant.
It would also appear that under Article 27(2) of the COMESA Treaty
all that a claimant need prove is the existence of a breach on the part
of the servants or employees of the Common Market. That personal
injury' 69 then becomes an issue in the calculation of damages. The
Treaty does not provide anywhere for individuals to prove that the
offending provision is directed at them personally or is of a direct and
individual concern to them and it can, therefore, be concluded that
normative acts can form the basis of claims under Article 27(2) of the
Treaty.
c. Grounds of Review
As a general proposition the constitution of every international
organization sets limits on the powers of that organization. 170 In addi-
tion, the various organs and institutions of the organization must have
their powers defined and limited.171 In setting the limits for the exer-
cise of power and providing for grounds of review1 72 whenever these
limits are alleged to have been exceeded, the COMESA Treaty makes
a distinction between references by Member States and references by
legal and natural persons. In as far as Member States are concerned
167 For a common law exposition of breach of duty see Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932 App.
Cas. 562.
168 See Dunlop Pneumatic TIyre Co. Ltd. v. Selfridge & Co. Ltd. [1915] App. Cas. 79.
169 Resulting from breach of a duty of care or breach of a contractual obligation.
170 It is also customary for the interpretation of these limits to be left to the executive organs
of the organization. See LJ BRmonST & H.G. SCHEMERS, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN THE Eu-
ROPEAN CommuNtrrmS (1977).
171 COMESA provides at art. 7(4) that the "organs of the Common Market shall perform
their functions and act within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by or under this
Treaty." COMESA, supra note 52, art. 7(4). The Treaty of Rome has a similar provision in art.
4(1). Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art. 4(1).
172 Some scholars prefer not to utilize the heading "grounds of review" but instead refer to
"grounds of illegality." See as an example of such categorization, GERHARD BEBR, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMumn-ms, 79 (1962).
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an action may lie in case of (i) ultra vires or unlawful acts, (ii) infringe-
ment of the provisions of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its
application, (iii) or in a case of misuse or abuse of power.173 For legal
and natural persons, a challenge can only originate from an unlawful
act or an infringement of a provision of the Treaty. 174 A casual glance
at the provisions for review within the Treaty indicates that they are
modelled on Common Law administrative law concepts and
understandings. 175
First, ultra vires or unlawful act, provides a good example of the
reliance on the Anglo-Saxon system by COMESA. The Treaty of
Rome17 6 utilizes a different concept; that is, incompetence 77 which
concept is fashioned from the French empirical classification known as
excis de pouvoir.178 There is some appreciable difference between the
two concepts with the French version having a wider scope and exhib-
iting more finesse.179 It is somehow odd that the COMESA Treaty' 80
at Article 26 omits the term "ultra vires" but chooses to retain the
term "unlawful" when referring to reference by legal and natural per-
sons whereas both terms have been employed in Article 24(2) which
deals with reference by Member States.' 8' The relatively limited
scope of ultra vires need not be viewed as a impediment to the
COMESA Court's jurisdiction, for much will depend on the interpre-
tation that the Court will give to this ground of review and the juris-
prudence that will develop around it.
Second, infringement of the provisions of the Treaty or any rule
of law relating to its application as a ground of review imports some
uncertainties. Would such a violation refer to substantive law or
would it also encompass procedural aspects? The question arises
chiefly because in all systems of administrative law, a distinction is
made between procedural law and substantive law which receive dif-
173 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 24(2).
174 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 26.
175 See infra note 179.
176 Treaty of Rome, supra note 81.
177 See Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art. 173.
178 Translated into English it means a "plea of ultra vires." CHARLES FREEDMAN, THm CON-
SEIL D'ETAT IN MODERN FRANcE; 133-138 (1961). The translation is clumsy and fails to com-
municate the many subtleties of the French term.
179 For a comparison of the two concepts see BERNARD ScHWART, FRENc- ADMINISTRA-
TrvE LAW AND THE COmMoN-LAw WoRLD, 200-02 (1954).
180 COMESA, supra note 52.
181 The only sensible inference that can be drawn here is that the drafters did not make a
distinction between the two, but rather considered the terms synonymous and, therefore, inter-
changeable. The terms are, however, not synonymous as unlawful definitely has a wider and




ferent treatment when it comes to interpretation and application. The
COMESA Treaty does not make such a distinction and this will cer-
tainly generate disputes in its interpretation and application.' 8 The
main dispute will revolve around the significance of the infringement.
Would a relatively minor and inconsequential infraction suffice to al-
low the Court to strike down the offending act, regulation, directive or
decision of the Authority or Council?18 3 The COMESA Court of Jus-
tice, if it were to adopt a plain-meaning interpretation of the Treaty,
does not have an option but to pronounce an annulment in such a
case. There is, therefore, no distinction being drawn between the
outer boundary of a COMESA organ's authority to treat or act on a
matter and those requirements by which a decision must be taken, a
predicament that necessitates a stiff interpretation and application of
COMESA law.'84 COMESA players will be frustrated when numer-
ous COMESA operations are held to be invalid as a result of minor
and inconsequential infractions."8
The other tenet of this ground of review speaks to the normative
acts of COMESA Council and which acts would be scrutinized under
"any rule of law relating to its application." Under Article 51(6) of
the COMESA Treaty, for example, it is provided that "proceedings
initiated pursuant to the provisions of this Article (on dumping) shall
be carried out in accordance with anti-dumping regulations made by
Council. 186 Regulations promulgated by Council under this provi-
sion would be open to scrutiny by the COMESA Court. Similarly,
Article 11 of the Treaty provides, inter alia, that "regulations, direc-
tives and decisions of the Council shall state the reasons on which they
are based"'187 which grants the COMESA Court jurisdiction to review
182 It is noteworthy that the equivalent provision in the Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, pro-
vides that an act may be challenged for "lack of competence, infringement of an essential proce-
dural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or
misuse of powers." Supra note 81, art. 173.
183 Art. 173 of the Treaty of Rome speaks of an "infringement of an essential procedural
requirement. .. ." which the European Court of Justice has interpreted to mean a major viola-
tion of procedure. Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art. 173. Also see eg., Beus Gmbh v.
Hauptzollamt Munchen-Landesbergerstrasse, 145 C.M.L.R (1968).
184 This inability to distinguish substance from procedure approximates the status of the
American doctrine of "due process" which seems to have, with time, grown to encompass both
substantive matters of law and procedural considerations.
185 It is worth noting that all administrative law systems incorporate the distinction between
procedural aspects of law and substantive elements and in the same vein provide a wide discre-
tion to adjudicative bodies to determine the character and importance of any procedural viola-
tion and whether such violation is sufficient to cause an annulment.
186 COMESA, supra note 52.
197 COMESA, supra note 52.
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such regulations, directives or decisions to see whether they are based
on the wrong reasons or are unsupported by the relevant facts. Such a
consequence may, for instance, be the result of illegal or improper
motives. The Court may also make reference to the objectives of the
COMESA Treaty to determine the legality of any action taken by the
COMESA Council. The consideration of motive and objective makes
this the widest ground of review and gives the Court its biggest scope.
No matter how distinct and precise the objectives of the COMESA
Treaty may be articulated and notwithstanding the bona fides of the
COMESA Council, the pronouncement of qualifications and limits
under which the various COMESA organs may exercise the powers
for attaining them would still necessitate an element of discretion.
Third, misuse or abuse of power' 1 appertains to those situations
where an act is undertaken for the attainment of a purpose outside the
scope of the COMESA Treaty. Even if the felonious purpose is not
accomplished, the unlawful intention will result in the annulment of
the act.189 Although this ground may potentially become the most
powerful ground of review within COMESA, it must be borne in mind
that just like other principles and doctrines in law that require proof
of bad faith, the evidentiary requirements that will prompt the
COMESA Court to conclude that a wrong or improper reason moti-
vated a Common Market act are steeped against the plaintiff. 90
As noted above' 9' legal and natural persons have a rather limited
access to the COMESA Court when it comes to judicial review. The
locus standi of these entities and the uncertainties of prosecuting a
claim have been discussed' 19 and perhaps the only noteworthy aspect
to investigate as regards judicial review is the requirement that in or-
der to challenge an act of a Member State such a legal or natural per-
188 Better known as ditournement depouvoir under French law and is the term often used in
the European Economic Community. In fact there is no corresponding ground known to Anglo-
American law and the closest literal translation would be "misuse of discretion" whereas the
term "misuse of power" gives a vague connotation. A ddtournement de pouvoir infringement
occurs when an act "though within the legal competence of the agent, is in reality done for
another purpose than that which the law authorises it had in mind." John F. Garner, French
Administrative Law, 33 YAiE L.J. 597, 609 (1924).
189 Wall states that this ground "directs attention to the end or object for which the power is
(allegedly wrongly) used, rather than to the intrinsic nature of the power itself." EDWARD
WALL, THE CouRT OF JusTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIEs, 96 (1966).
190 Suffice it to say here that within the European Economic Community this ground has
rarely succeeded despite numerous attempts. See CLARENCE MANN, T-m FUNCTION OF JUDI-
CiAL DECISION iN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, 57 (1972).
191 Supra note 119 and accompanying text.
192 Supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
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son must be a resident of that Member State. 93 Viewed from the
standpoint that COMESA is about regional economic integration in
which cross-border trade and movement of capital is incrementally
unregulated, the requirement of residence becomes a misnomer in this
wider outlook. Regional trade, perforce, assumes that the wider
COMESA market will be available to all players in the Common Mar-
ket. An entrepreneur resident in one country who engages in cross-
border trade with another country cannot sue the latter country for
breach of treaty obligations under Article 26 of the COMESA
Treaty' 94 because he does not reside there. This provision, inter alia,
encourages Member States to discriminate against non-residents be-
cause they know they will be immune from suits.195 The residency
requirement is out of sync with the raison d'etre for the Common
Market.
d. Failure to Act
Not only may an affirmative act be annulled for illegality but fail-
ure of the Common Market or its organs to act may similarly consti-
tute an illegality which is a ground for action before the Court. A
motion based on inaction is, therefore, the compliment of the motion
for annulment as it compels the organs of the Common Market to act
in circumstances where inaction violates the COMESA Treaty.196 The
COMESA Treaty does not elaborately provide for the procedure for
challenging inaction and the only reference can be drawn from Article
17(7)(h) which empowers the Secretary-General, subject to the provi-
sions of the Treaty, to "submit references to the Court concerning the
alleged breach of any obligation under this Treaty in relation to the
Common Market or as to any action or omission affecting the Com-
193 The European Economic Community avoids this potentially hazardous requirement by
merely requiring that a natural or legal person may "institute proceedings against a decision
addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a
decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former." Treaty
of Rome, supra note 81, art. 173.
194 COMESA, supra note 52.
195 Of course the aggrieved person may implore his Member State to take up the matter on
his behalf and bring the offending Member State to Court under art. 24(1) of the COMESA
Treaty or the Secretary-General may initiate action under art. 25.
The pursuit of any of the above courses of action defeats one of the primary advantages of
the new Treaty which was to depoliticize the process of integration. COMESA, supra note 52.
196 The basis of such violation caused by inaction is derived from the affirmative imploration
of art. 10(1) of the COMESA Treaty, which stipulates that "[t]he Council may, in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make recom-
mendations or deliver opinions." COMESA, supra note 52, art. 10.
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mon Market."'" Within COMESA an appeal for inaction can only be
initiated by the Secretary-General operating under powers which are
very circumscribed. 9 8 From a practical point of view Member States
have an indirect power to institute an appeal for inaction as they are
able, when constituted as the COMESA Council, to direct the Secre-
tary-General to refer a matter to the COMESA Court. 99
A disturbing anomaly, however, exists as to the competence of
the Secretary-General to initiate action in respect of inaction by other
COMESA organs. The wording of Article 17(7)(h) of the COMESA
Treaty2°° leaves no doubt as to the competence of the Secretary-Gen-
eral to refer any breach by any party to the COMESA process to the
COMESA Court. Nonetheless, Article 25 of the COMESA Treaty201
which governs references by the Secretary-General to the Court only
envisages the Secretary-General bringing an action against a Member
State. The issue that then arises is whether Article 25 of the Treaty
negates the powers of the Secretary-General provided under Article
17(7)(h) to the extent of any inconsistencies. It is submitted that the
former Treaty provision supersedes the latter as the former stipulates
jurisdiction whilst the latter merely enumerates functions and
responsibilities.
Even supposing that the Secretary-General were not incapaci-
tated by Article 25 of the Treaty, he is in a difficult position with re-
197 The basic provision of the Treaty which the Secretary-General must comply with is Article
25 which states that:
1. Where the Secretary-General considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obli-
gation under this Treaty, or has infringed a provision of this Treaty he shall submit his find-
ings to the Member State concerned to enable that Member State to submit its observations
on the findings.
2. If the Member State concerned does not submit its observations to the Secretary-Gen-
eral within two months, or if the observations submitted are unsatisfactory, the Secretary-
General shall refer the matter to the Bureau of the Council which shall decide whether the
matter shall be referred by the Secretary-General to the Court immediately or be referred
to the Council.
3. Where a matter has been referred to the Council under the provisions of paragraph 2 of
this Article and the Council fails to resolve the matter, the Council shall direct the Secre-
tary-General to refer the matter to the Court.
The institutionalization of negotiation between an offending Member State and the Council
reflects a certain conspicuous restraint in dealing with Member States. COMESA, supra note
52.
198 COMESA, supra note 52.
199 COMESA, supra note 52.
200 COMESA, supra note 52.
201 COMESA, supra note 52. The heading of the article reads "Reference by the Secretary-
General" and seems to encompass the whole jurisdiction and competence of his office as regards
standing before the Court. The article is in fact placed in the middle of articles dealing with
reference by other parties to the Court and it is, therefore, plainly meant to establish the entire
competence of the Secretary-General to bring action before the Court.
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gard to initiating an appeal for inaction against the COMESA
Authority or Council as he acts as the Secretary to both organs.2°
Other than against a Member State, the Secretary-General can only
institute an appeal for inaction against other institutions2 3 of
COMESA with the exception of the Authority and the Council. An
action against a Member State for inaction under this provision would
in most instances succeed because of the procedural rigors2°4 that
would have already been fulfilled before the matter gets to the
COMESA Court. When an action is initiated there will be evidence
showing that the Secretary-General did issue a notice to the offending
Member State concerning the nature of inaction and the Member
State had time to comply but did not.205 Giving notice to the offend-
ing Member State acts as a condition precedent to instituting a claim
for inaction. Natural and legal persons do not have the right to insti-
tute proceedings for inaction within COMESA.2°
It does appear that the drafters of the COMESA Treaty 07 did
not pay sufficient attention to inaction as a cause of action and that
Article 17(7)(h) of the Treaty208 was never intended to confer such a
power. This conclusion can be drawn from the absurd outcomes that
are precipitated by assuming that an action for inaction is tenable
under COMESA. Limiting the Secretary-General to institute pro-
ceedings for inaction and, indeed, making the Secretary-General the
only competent party to institute such action renders the ground a
nullity. It would have been preferable to expose all COMESA players
that have been assigned positive obligations to proceedings for inac-
tion to ensure compliance with Treaty provisions. The fact that the
Council,2° 9 the Authority and COMESA institutions are outside the
202 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 17(7)(e).
203 A complicated position bearing in mind that the COMESA Court does not apparently
have jurisdiction to interpret the constitutive instruments of these institutions. See infra notes
110-126 and accompanying text.
204 COMESA, supra note 52.
205 Compare with art. 175 of the Treaty of Rome which, inter alia, provides with respect to
inaction that:
The action shall be admissible only if the institution concerned has been called upon to act.
If, within two months of being so called upon, the institution concerned has not defined its
position, the action may be brought within a further period of two months.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art. 175.
206 With reference to the European Economic Community, natural and legal persons have the
power to prosecute an appeal based on inaction under art. 175 of the Treaty of Rome. Id.
207 COMESA, supra note 52.
208 COMESA, supra note 52.
209 The Council, in particular, is charged with the execution of virtually all the critical aspects
of COMESA and should have been the organ that faced suits for inaction.
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challenge of this particular ground removes a very effective supervi-
sory tool from the COMESA process.
e. Preliminary Rulings
The provision for preliminary rulings by the COMESA Court is
meant to insure that there is uniformity in the interpretation and ap-
plication of COMESA law by judicial authorities in the Member
States.210  To realize this objective, it is anticipated that national
courts211 will collaborate with the COMESA Court in mutual regard
of their respective competences.212
The COMESA Court's jurisdiction with regard to preliminary
rulings is, in a sense, not self-operating but is bestowed upon it by
national courts. If national courts show reluctance in utilizing this ju-
risdiction, the COMESA Court cannot call on any compelling prerog-
ative to be seized of jurisdiction.2 1 3 According to Article 30 of the
COMESA Treaty whenever issues touching on the interpretation of
the COMESA Treaty are raised in a national court such court shall, "if
it considers that a ruling on the question is necessary, '214 refer the
matter to the COMESA Court.215 National courts of last instance216
210 This uniform and unitary purpose strives to secure a judicial philosophy in which national
courts and the COMESA Court are viewed as belonging to one regime and not separate re-
gimes. See JURGEN SCHWARzE, Tim ROLE OF rm EUROPEAN COURT OF JUsTIcE IN T=E INTER-
PRETATION OF UNIFoRM LAW AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
21 (1988).
211 Under art. 30 of COMESA, the competence to refer matters is vested in "any court or
tribunal of a Member State." COMESA, supra note 52, art. 30. It is submitted that such a
judicial body must be one that is a public body competent to make legal findings. A private
arbitrator determining a private contractual dispute may not be competent to refer a matter to
the COMESA Court. This is a common sense interpretation of the Treaty for a contrary reading
of the Treaty would create a flood of references from all manner of quasi-judicial organs that
will, as a necessity, have to interact with COMESA.
212 Advocate-General Lagrange, speaking with regard to the European Economic Commu-
nity position, states that "[a]pplied judiciously-one is tempted to say loyally-the provisions of
Article 177 lead to a real and fruitful collaboration between the municipal courts and the Court
of Justice of the Communities .... ROBER BoscH v. KLEDING-VERKOOPBEDRXG, [1962]
CMLR 1, 6.
213 The power of national courts to snub this jurisdiction may be gauged from the EEC expe-
rience where in the early phases of the Community, national courts, and in particular, highest
courts, were reluctant to seek preliminary rulings fearing that their absolute authority to inter-
pret national law could be subordinated to the European Court's exclusive competence to inter-
pret Community law. See Gerhard Bebr, Article 177 of the EEC Treaty in the Practice of
National Courts, 26 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 241 (1977).
214 COMESA, supra note 52.
215 As to references stemming from interlocutory proceedings it appears that the most sensi-
ble course to adopt is to curtail references unless a lack of interpretation makes it impossible to
dispose of the interlocutory proceedings. Often times interlocutory proceedings are brought
under certificates of urgency in which time is of the essence and a reference would negate the
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do not enjoy the liberal and permissive benefit of discretion that lower
courts have, but must 2 17 refer the matter to the COMESA Court.
218
A critical, and rather peculiar, aspect of Article 30 is that it en-
compasses both interpretation and application of the COMESA
Treaty. A reference based on interpretation seems to be the natural
raison d'etre for having preliminary rulings. However, to suggest that
application of treaty provisions can form a proper ground for seeking
a preliminary ruling would be a misapplication of the mechanism. 19
There are two issues that raise troubling queries. One, in order for
the COMESA Court to issue a ruling on the application of a treaty
provision it would have to be furnished with the facts of the matter for
it to make a determination about the applicability of the relevant
treaty provision to the facts. Two, what would be the propriety of
supplying the COMESA Court with facts for its determination and
then sending the case back to a national court for final disposition? A
determination of facts in relation to a treaty provision conclusively
disposes of the case. Stated differently, a determination of facts dis-
purpose of seeking interlocutory orders. Similarly, granting a stay whilst a reference is sought,
may inflict enormous harm on one of the parties. For a discussion of how English courts have
dealt with this issue in the ambit of the EEC regime, see Bulmer v. Bollinger, 3 WEEKLY L. RP.
202 (1974). Note, Art. 177 of the EEC Treaty and English Interlocutory Proceedings, 23 INT'L &
Cow. L.Q. 840 (1974).
The decision in Bulmer v. Bollinger, is contrary to the intentions of the Treaty of Rome as it
seeks to lay down conditions for subordinate courts in deciding when to refer a matter to the
European Court of Justice. Under the Treaty the exercise of this discretion must be unfettered.
For a supporting view, see FRANCIs JACOBS & ANDRE DURAND, REFERENCES TO Tm EURO-
PE.AN COURT. PRAcncE AND PROCEDURE, 159 (1975).
216 A critical study of the phraseology leaves no doubt that a court of last instance does not
necessarily connote the highest court in a particular Member Country. This is so because the
relevant criteria is a court or tribunal "whose judgement is there is no judicial remedy under"
national law. There are many instances in national law where lower courts determine issues
from which no appeal can be allowed or where a subordinate appellate court has the final say on
an issue. An example can be found in the Kenyan law that stipulates that constitutional matters
are to be dealt with exclusively by a specially constituted High Court constitutional bench and
from which no appeal can be entertained by the Kenyan Court of Appeal. Kenya Const. sec. 67.
217 The obligation is not as compulsive as it may first appear. A court of last instance may
argue that the issue before it is clear, an appeal to the acte clair doctrine-where a point is so clear
a national judge need not refer the matter for interpretation and no interpretation of the Treaty
is required or that the issue has already been determined by the COMESA Court in a previous
ruling. See KURT Linsmn , LAW OF Tnm EUROPEAN ECONOMiC CoMMtmrry, 329-330 (1974).
The intransigence of a final court can work to frustrate this avenue to the COMESA Court as no
appeal can be lodged to the COMESA Court arising from the refusal of a national court to refer
a matter to the COMESA Court. This merely emphasizes that the exercise of this jurisdiction
depends on the attitude and practice of national courts.
218 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 30.
219 The proper course of action would be to proceed by way of annulment utilizing the vari-
ous grounds of review.
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charges the preliminary aspect of the reference as there will be noth-
ing to send back for determination. 220 Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
COMESA Court to determine the application of treaty provisions is
going to put it in a collision course with national courts who will feel,
quite legitimately, that the Court is encroaching on an area that
should ordinarily be left to national courts." It must be noted once
again that the COMESA Court, in exercising its jurisdiction under this
head, is not competent to interpret the instruments creating
COMESA institutions.'
In the overall framework of the Common Market it is important
to note that it is in the giving of preliminary rulings that the COMESA
Court is brought into direct relationship with courts and tribunals of
Member States. How this relationship develops will impact on the
overall direction the Common Market will take. If no judicial and
jurisdictional symbiosis is attained, tensions and suspicions will be
generated which will in turn work against the attainment of the goals
of the Common Market. An indicator of the relationship that devel-
ops will be gauged from the precedential value that national courts
will accord preliminary rulings delivered by the COMESA Court. As
a matter of law, a preliminary ruling can only be binding with respect
to the case before a domestic court in which the need for it arose.
However, good practice demands that such a ruling should be fol-
lowed in other cases before national courts of the same or any other
Member State where the same question at issue in the preliminary
ruling arises again. Such comity will be possible only where the rela-
tionship between the COMESA Court and national courts and tribu-
nals is amicable.
The decision to refer a matter to the COMESA Court by a lower
court of first instance does provide a new feature to the hierarchical
relationship of municipal courts inter se. In a majority of COMESA
Member States it will be the first time that subordinate courts will
have an unchallengeable recourse to an international tribunal without
needing to go through superior courts and, in the same vein, have a
220 This is not to say that the Court has no jurisdiction in the matter for art. 23 of COMESA,
which gives the Court wide jurisdiction with respect to the operations of the Common Market by
providing that "[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters which may be
referred to it pursuant to this Treaty." COMESA, supra note 52, art 23.
221 The European Court of Justice has been able to gain the confidence of national courts,
which were hitherto reluctant to refer matters to the court for preliminary rulings, partly by
refraining from applying the provisions of Community law to the concrete case before it. See
Bebr, supra note 213, at 249.
222 See supra note 113.
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rare opportunity to consider the interpretation and application of an
international instrument. It remains to be seen how superior courts
will adapt to this "erosion" of their supervisory jurisdiction over lower
courts.
f. Advisory Opinions
Given the extensive nature of the COMESA Treaty and the rela-
tive inexperience of those charged with the realization of treaty obli-
gations, it was foreseen that in many instances, these players would be
unsure of their treaty obligations and functions with respect to certain
desired actions. To resolve such uncertainties, the Treaty provides for
these players to seek the guidance of the COMESA Court as to the
compatibility of any action they might wish to take with treaty provi-
sions.22 This mechanism is bound to be exceptionally useful in the
operation of the Common Market partly because it will eliminate the
need to institute adversarial judicial proceedings and the attendant
negative effects that such proceedings necessarily engender, particu-
larly if the contending parties are Member States.
The jurisdiction of the COMESA Court to issue an advisory opin-
ion is extensive and covers "all questions of law arising from the pro-
visions of" the COMESA Treaty22 4 which, in actual fact, means
practically all aspects of COMESA application as it is difficult to envi-
sion what aspects fall outside the ambit of law.2-5 There are two ways
to explain this wide jurisdiction. One, because uncertainty about the
legality of an intended course of action can arise from any facet of
COMESA it is necessary to give the Court a wide jurisdiction to sort
out any anxieties about the efficacy of such intended action. This cre-
ates a supervisory jurisdiction by the Court over the general opera-
tions of COMESA. Two, Member States had no problem ceding such
wide powers to the Court because no positive rights are concerned.
223 Art. 32(1) of the Treaty provides that:
The Authority, the Council or a Member State may request the Court to give an advisory
opinion regarding questions of law arising from the provisions of this Treaty affecting the
Common market, and Member States shall in the case of every such request have the right
to be represented and take part in the proceedings.
COMESA, supra note 52, art. 32(1).
224 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 32(1).
225 It is still submitted that instruments creating institutions of COMESA quite legitimately
fall under this extensive jurisdiction. The permissive provision here is questions "affecting the
Common Market." Clearly institutions of COMESA will have an effect on the operations of the
Common Market. It is strange that the COMESA Court has jurisdiction to interpret instru-
ments creating COMESA institutions in a situation where such jurisdiction does not confer posi-
tive rights or remedies and lacks jurisdiction where it can confer such rights or remedies. See
supra notes 107-127 and accompanying text.
479
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The Court was merely allowed to issue opinions which, in the general
nature of advisory opinions, have no binding effect.
2 6
There is, however, a restriction that has been placed on the exer-
cise of this jurisdiction; only the Authority, the Council or a Member
State may seek such an opinion. This is a sensible restriction to limit
jurisdiction to parties who will ordinarily be in charge of formulating
and executing COMESA policies. Without this limitation and assum-
ing that legal and natural persons were eligible to plead this jurisdic-
tion, the Court would be swamped with suits that do not determine
substantive rights but which merely seek the Court's articulation of
certain COMESA legal points. There would in any case be a duplica-
tion of jurisdiction if legal and natural persons had a right to seek an
advisory opinion. Such persons, instead of proceeding for an annul-
ment, would prefer to seek the Court's opinion first.2 7 If the Court's
opinion is favorable they would then institute a substantive motion for
annulment and the Court would then have to determine the issue de
novo based on the same facts guaranteeing the same result. In any
case it is doubtful what use an advisory opinion would be to a legal or
natural person if it is noted that they cannot utilize such an opinion to
formulate or reshape COMESA policies.
A special feature of this mechanism is that Member States have a
right to submit written or oral information regarding a request for an
advisory opinion's in a procedure equivalent to "interested parties"
in municipal law. This is of great help to the Court as it brings to the
fore the concerns and fears of other Member Countries regarding the
consequence of holding one way or the other on the matter referred
to it. The Court is, therefore, in a better position to compromise the
competing interests within the Common Market.229
226 Suffice it to say here that though advisory opinions have no binding effect, it is foolhardy
to act contrary to such opinions. Foolhardy because a party that acts contrary to an advisory
opinion will be faced with a substantive action before the same court in which the party is sure to
lose, the Court already having established its stand in the advisory opinion.
227 See the qualification of the competence of legal and natural persons to prosecute a claim
for annulment, supra notes 191-195 and accompanying text.
228 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 32(3).
229 It is worthwhile to note that the European Economic Community has no equivalent provi-
sion. An advisory opinion can be sought only in the case of the Community concluding a treaty
with one or more states or international organizations in which case the Council, the Commis-
sion or a Member State may obtain the opinion of the European Court of Justice as to whether





g. Disputes Concerning Relationships Between the Community
and its Servants
The COMESA Court is the obvious choice for adjudicating dis-
putes arising from employment contracts of Common Market employ-
ees. Obvious in the sense that Common Market employees and
contracts they execute do not fall within the jurisdiction of any of the
Member States; they are contracts governed by public, not private,
law.3 0 Article 27 of the COMESA Treaty gives exclusive jurisdiction
to the COMESA Court to determine disputes between the Common
Market and its employees and to interpret rules and regulations gov-
erning the terms and conditions of employment of the employees of
the Common Market 3 1
h. Reference by virtue of a "Clause Compromissoire"
Jurisdiction is conferred by the COMESA Treaty2 32 on the
COMESA Court to determine issues arising under a contract if a
clause conferring jurisdiction (clause compromissoire) is contained in
the contract and that contract is made by or on behalf of the Common
Market or any of its institutions. The qualification here relates to
those contracts in which at least one party is either the Common Mar-
ket or its institution. Given this restrictive jurisdiction, it is unlikely
that the COMESA Court will be active in this area. For example, it is
unlikely that third parties, be they private individuals or other legal
persons, who enter into contractual arrangements with the Common
Market or any of its institutions will provide that disputes be referred
to the COMESA Court. A party to a contract who chooses arbitra-
tion will normally ensure that the arbiter not only is going to be im-
partial but that an appearance of impartiality can be guaranteed.
Because of the nexus between the Court and the Common Market,
230 By virtue of art. 5(2)(a) of COMESA, the Common Market has legal personality of public
law considering the powers and functions of the Common Market. COMESA, supra note 52,
art. 5(2)(a). Because of this status, employment contracts of Common Market employees are
concluded by a person of public law, making such contracts public law instruments.
231 Art. 27(1) of the Treaty provides that
The Court shall have jurisdiction to hear disputes between the Common Market and its
employees that arise out of the application and interpretation of the Staff Rules and Regula-
tions of the Secretariat of the terms and conditions of employment of the employees of the
Common Market.
COMESA, supra note 52, art. 27(1).
232 Art. 28(a) provides that "[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any
matter arising from an arbitration clause contained in a contract which confers such jurisdiction
to which the Common Market or any of its institutions is a party." COMESA, supra note 52, art.
28(a).
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third parties will naturally be apprehensive of its impartiality when the
Common Market is a party before it in an arbitration.
33
The COMESA Treaty is, as was noted earlier,23 4 silent on the is-
sue of what law applies to the interpretation of contracts. It does not
state whether there exists a Common Market law which will be appli-
cable in such instances. The applicable law is exceedingly important
when analyzing this provision because, as stated, one of the parties to
the contract must be the Common Market or any of its institutions.
Because of the absence of a provision stipulating the applicable law
the COMESA Court will be compelled to apply principles of private
international law for the purpose of identifying the proper law of the
contract which will often times lead to the application of the law of a
Member State, or even a non-Member State.
i. Reference by virtue of a Special Agreement
This jurisdiction is bestowed upon the COMESA Court by Arti-
cle 28(b) of the COMESA Treaty which provides that the "Court shall
have jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter arising from a dis-
pute between the Member States regarding this treaty if the dispute is
submitted to it under a special agreement between the member States
concerned. '23 5 It is to be noted that this opening is restricted to Mem-
ber States.
A useful inquiry relates to the competence of a Member State to
initiate a claim or seek redress outside the established procedures of
the Common Market and in particular to bring a claim against another
Member State in an international tribunal other than the COMESA
Court. The COMESA Treaty is, strictly speaking, an ordinary treaty
among several states and is, therefore, governed by traditional rules of
international law. Generally such a treaty would entitle any of its sig-
natories, ceteris paribus, to sue another signatory before, for example,
the Court of Justice at the Hague.
The object of Article 28(b) of the Treaty would appear to be the
internalization of disputes within the COMESA process and the elimi-
nation of the need or option to seek redress on issues generated by the
Common Market outside the COMESA process. However, this ob-
233 This perhaps explains why the European Court of Justice has never been called upon to
arbitrate a contractual dispute under art. 181 of the Treaty of Rome, which is similar to the
COMESA provision. In fact, all the arbitrations that the European Court of Justice has dealt
with involved employment contracts of Community employees.
234 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
235 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 28(b).
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jective is not realized when the wording of Article 28(b) is analyzed
critically. The provision merely gives jurisdiction but does not compel
reference when a dispute arises. Neither is there an undertaking any-
where else in the COMESA Treaty which obliges Member States to
use the COMESA Court to resolve disputes arising from the Treaty.
To the extent that the Treaty does not mandate the use of COMESA
mechanisms for dispute settlement, Member States are free to utilize
other fora with competent jurisdiction for dispute settlement.23 6 It is
certainly unhelpful for the process of integration if Member States are
permitted to engage in forum shopping with a view to guaranteeing a
certain result. The COMESA Treaty needs to bring all COMESA
players under the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMESA Court and to
oust all jurisdiction of other tribunals over disputes between Member
States of COMESA to ensure a uniform and dependable integration
system.
j. COMESA Court's Competences and Residual National
Court's Competences
Lest it appears that the COMESA Court is going to overwhelm
national courts and create legal tremors in municipal law, it must be
pointed out that the COMESA Court's competence extends only to
those aspects specifically provided for by the Treaty and all other
residual competences, and it must be emphasized that they are numer-
ous, are reserved to national courts. As a general principle the
COMESA Court has no exclusive jurisdiction over the Common Mar-
ket. None of the Common Market operations is immune from the
jurisdiction of national courts. Stated differently, the Common Mar-
ket is subject to the jurisdiction of national courts except where it is
expressly or impliedly excluded in favor of that of the COMESA
Court by the COMESA Treaty.
This position represents the true import of Article 29(1) of the
Treaty23 7 which provides that "[e]xcept where the jurisdiction is con-
ferred on the Court by or under this Treaty, disputes to which the
Common Market is a party shall not on that ground alone be excluded
from the jurisdiction of national courts." National courts are, there-
236 The European Economic Community has managed to avoid this multiplicity of dispute
resolution options by providing that "Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concern-
ing the interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those
provided for herein." Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, art. 219.
237 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 29(1).
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fore, the key players in the resolution of disputes arising out of the
operations of the Common Market.
A particularly difficult jurisdictional problem arises from the
competence to delimit the jurisdictions of national courts from that of
the COMESA Court. If it is accepted that national courts retain juris-
diction in all matters that have not been expressly bestowed on the
COMESA Court, a complication arises as to who may determine the
extent of these two jurisdictions in case of a conflict. Undoubtedly,
the COMESA Court will insist that it has been given exclusive juris-
diction to interpret the COMESA Treaty and will go ahead and at-
tempt to limit the exercise of its jurisdiction133 8 National courts, in
exercising general jurisdiction, will also define their jurisdiction. That
the two interpretations of the extent and nature of their respective
jurisdictions will be different is indisputable. It is, therefore, foresee-
able that the power to delimit the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMESA Court from the general jurisdiction of national courts may
unfortunately be shared by the COMESA Court and national courts.
Because there will be jurisdictional conflicts, there is need to provide
for a special tribunal to determine these conflicts or alternatively for
the inclusion of a general provision in the Treaty to govern such
conflicts.
2. Staffing and Procedure of the COMESA Court
The COMESA Court is composed of seven239 judges who are ap-
pointed by the Authority.24 0 However, no two or more judges shall at
any time be nationals of the same Member State.241 They are chosen
from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess
the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial of-
fices in their respective countries or who are jurists of recognized com-
238 This is a powerful argument as COMESA reserves the interpretation of the Treaty to the
COMESA Court. A conflict of jurisdiction does undoubtedly imply a treaty interpretation.
However, under art. 30, it is only courts of final appellate jurisdiction that are obliged to
refer a matter of interpretation to the COMESA Court. It is conceivable that a lower court may
refuse to refer the matter and go ahead and delimit its jurisdiction.
An errant national court need not necessarily frustrate the jurisdiction of the COMESA
Court. For example, the Member State concerned may be in breach of the Treaty, and therefore
subject to an appeal before the COMESA Court, if it should let such a decision stand.
COMESA, supra note 52, art. 30.
239 Which, of course, means that not all Member States are represented. It would be falla-
cious to provide representation by all Member Countries as not only would the Court's work
become cumbersome and labyrinthine but it is doubtful whether the Common Market can afford
to pay salaries for an expanded bench.
240 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 20(1).




petence.242 Other than the proviso barring two or more judges being
appointed from the same Member State there is no requirement of
nationality, so that, a judge of the COMESA Court can be drawn
from persons of a nationality other than that of one of the Member
States.243 Although the COMESA Treaty provides for the appoint-
ment of seven judges this number can be increased by the Authority if
the Court makes a request for additional judges 44 and if need should
arise out of some unforeseen circumstances or emergency, the Au-
thority may appoint a temporary judge.24 Judges hold office for a
period of five years and shall be eligible for reappointment for a fur-
ther period of five years.246
A judge may not by reason of his nationality alone recuse himself
from hearing a matter nor can the nationality of any judge be invoked
in order to ask for a change in composition of the Court. The point to
be emphasized here is that judges appointed to the Court are not rep-
resentatives of their Member States. The only ground upon which a
judge may ask to be excused from hearing a matter is when such judge
is directly or indirectly interested247 in a case before the Court and the
President of the Court has certified the interest is prejudicial.
248
Given the feeble nature of COMESA integration it would not be sur-
prising if nationality of judges were to produce conflicts within the
process. In developing countries, there is a tendency to liken regional
integration with equality of Member States involved so that each
Member State expects to have as much say and involvement in the
process as the other Members. A lot will therefore depend on how
Member States who are not represented on the Court will react, par-
ticularly when such Members States appear before the Court as par-
242 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 20(2).
243 There would be a difficulty in appointing a judge from a non-Member State in that such a
third state would not be in a position to grant such a judge immunities that other judges from
Member States would ordinarily be entitled.
244 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 20(3).
245 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 22(3).
246 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 21(1).
247 It is submitted that as the only qualification placed on a judge, it is insufficient. It is very
likely that the Court will not be active in its early days and that judges will have plenty of time
on their hands in which they will be tempted to engage in other activities, e.g., arbitration. These
"other activities" have the potential of disrupting the working of the Court and it would have
been preferable to provide that Judges may not hold any other office nor engage in any other
occupation or profession whether paid or unpaid without the express permission of the Author-
ity or the President of the Court.
248 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 22(4).
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ties involved in a matter against Member States who are represented
on the Court.24 9
The President of the Court is also appointed by the Authority
from among the judges of the Court.5 0 The Treaty does not set out
the precise duties of the President of the Court and it is understanda-
ble that such matters will be left to be stipulated by the Statute of the
Court.25 1
The day-to-day administration of the business of the Court falls
on the Registrar of the Court.5 2 The Registrar is appointed by the
Council from among nationals of Member States qualified to hold
high judicial office 5 3 and the terms and conditions of service are to be
determined by the Council on the recommendation of the Court.5 4
The other staff of the Court is similarly appointed by the Council.
In order to ensure that once they are appointed the judges shall
not be prevented from acting with entire impartiality, the COMESA
Treaty255 endows them with immunity. Judges are immune from legal
action for any act or omission committed in the discharge of their
functions under the Treaty. 5 6 An interesting comment relates to the
determination of "functions under this Treaty" and who is to make
this determination. A COMESA judge facing legal action in a matter
not related to his functions under the Treaty may require any munici-
pal court to refer the matter to the COMESA Court for an interpreta-
tion of the Treaty to determine whether the act or omission alleged
was committed in the discharge of his function under the Treaty or
not. This is the logical conclusion arising from the provision of the
Treaty which reserves the competence to interpret the Treaty to the
COMESA Court.
The COMESA Court renders its judgment as a collegiate body.
The Court delivers one judgment and dissenting opinions may be re-
249 Compare with Andean Group: Treaty Creating The Court of Justice of the Caragena
Agreement, May 28,1979 18 I.L.M. 1203. Art. 7(1) of the Treaty provides for the election of five
justices from each of the five Member States. This is not a really good comparison as the limited
membership of the grouping, five members, allows it to tap a justice from each of the Member
State without overstaffing the Court.
250 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 20(1).
251 At the time of writing this work the Court had yet to formulate its rules which it has the
power to do under art. 38 of the Treaty which stipulates that the "Court shall make Rules of
Court which shall, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, regulate the detailed conduct of busi-
ness of the Court." COMESA, supra note 52, art. 38.
252 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 41.
253 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 41.
254 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 41.
255 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 39.
256 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 39.
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corded but may not be delivered in open court.2 57 Although dissent-
ing opinions are useful in the development of law, they can also be
destructive, particularly in the early phases of a judicial system.
2 5 8
It would have been more enterprising if the COMESA Treaty
had provided for the formation of chambers when the contesting par-
ties make such a request or in certain specified matters. Chambers are
more flexible and by reducing the number of judges the process can
be made to proceed at a faster pace.
2 59
B. Arbitration Under COMESA
The COMESA Court, as was noted above,26" has an arbitration
jurisdiction which is limited, however, to those instances where the
Common Market is a party to a contract that provides for such an
arbitration. Private parties do not, therefore, qualify to bring arbitra-
tion matters before the COMESA Court. This is a serious limitation
on the part of the COMESA Court and without an alternative, legal
and natural persons engaged in business within the COMESA would
be highly disadvantaged. Fortunately, an arbitral process exists within
the COMESA process which is charged with the responsibility of
dealing with private international commercial disputes-Centre de
Service Arbitrage261 in Djibouti. The Centre existed before it was
brought into the regional process under the PTA. Soon after the es-
tablishment of the PTA there was a growing realization that the PTA
Tribunal was not the proper and most efficient forum for resolving
international commercial disputes that did not involve state agencies.
Consequently the PTA decided to establish a centre to deal with pri-
vate international commercial arbitration.262 The PTA did not estab-
lish its own arbitral centre but decided to enter into a designation
agreement with the Djibouti Centre in which the latter undertook to
257 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 31.
258 Within the European Economic Community there are no dissenting opinions at all and
Bebr has stated with regard to this situation that at "an early stage in the development of the
Community law this may be wise for it avoids judgements whose validity may be seriously weak-
ened by separate dissenting opinions of individual judges. A certainty of judgement at this stage
of development may count for more than a fragile soundness arrived at and impaired by individ-
ual opinions." Bebr, supra note 172, at 24. However, Bebr is quick to point out that there are
drawbacks to this system including the tendency for judges to reach compromises to accommo-
date each other which process weakens the forcefilness of the Court's judgements. Id
259 See art. 165 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 81, for the operations of chambers within
the European Economic Community.
260 See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text.
261 Hereinafter Centre.
262 This was decided upon in November, 1988. See Report of the 5th Meeting of General
Assembly of PTA/FCCI, Appendices to Annex 1.
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act as the PTA's arbitration centre.263 A Statute governing the admin-
istration of the Centre was also adopted.264 The COMESA Treaty has
adopted the Centre as one of its institutions performing the same
functions as before.265
The Centre follows the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules as modified by the COMESA Centre
Arbitration and Conciliation Rules.266 The Centre has had, however,
an inconsequential impact on dispute resolution in the region. This is
attributable mainly to three factors.
One, there has been little intra-regional trade generated by the
COMESA process and its predecessor, the PTA. In real terms, there-
fore, disputes can only arise where there is an active body of partici-
pants engaged in international commercial trade and because the
volume of such trade is minimal disputes are also rare.
Two, arbitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes is rela-
tively new in the region and there is still a heavy reliance placed on
traditional and conventional court systems. Even in those instances
where arbitration is preferred the enforcement regime is still undevel-
oped and unreliable.267 This position is beginning to change as the
limitations of domestic courts become more apparent to cross-border
traders. The establishment of the COMESA Court will also impact on
this development.
Third, it is true that a majority of those involved in regional trade
within COMESA are foreign multi-national corporations or affiliates
of such corporations. There is a tendency among these players to es-
chew local systems and procedures in favor of overseas institutions.
This attitude is informed by the perceived bias of local institutions
against multi-national corporations particularly in disputes with local
entities. Although there may be no empirical evidence of such bias,
nonetheless the perception is strong enough to cause these corpora-
tions to prefer overseas arbitrations.
A critical element in the development of arbitration as an alter-
native dispute resolution mechanism must surely lie with the enforce-
263 Id.
264 Id., Appendix II note 1.
265 COMESA, supra note 52, art. 174(2)(h).
266 Report of the 5th Meeting, supra note 262, art. 2. This provision states, inter alia, that one
of the objectives of the Centre shall be "to provide administrative and technical assistance in the
conduct of arbitrations and conciliations particularly those held under the UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation Rules as modified by the PTA [read COMESA] Arbitration and Concilia-
tion Rules."
267 See infra note 271.
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ment of.arbitral awards. 68 If awards are incapable of enforcement
within municipal jurisdictions there will be no incentive to pursue ar-
bitration in the first place. With this realization, the PTA Council of
Ministers in November, 1988 recommended that all Member States
accede to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Arbitral Awards.26 9 Although this was an important
step in strengthening arbitration within the region, it must be noted
that acceding to the Convention does not of itself guarantee enforce-
ment of arbitral awards270 There is need to provide within municipal
jurisdictions stipulations that protect arbitral awards from intrusive
municipal enquiries which might water down the efficacy of
arbitration.27
VI. CONCLUSION
If the failure of regional integration in developing countries so far
can be attributed to one factor, that factor must be the lack of an
elaborate and well thought-out dispute resolution regime. This defect
has become magnified by the changing political and economic dynam-
ics at the world stage. Whereas states and state agencies were the
dominant economic and political players both within the domestic as
well regional spheres in developing countries, at least for the last half-
century, in the so-called New World Order the dynamics at play have
been rearranged and the emphasis is now squarely on private capital
and individualism. Whereas inter-state and largely politically oriented
dispute resolution mechanisms sufficed for the former state of affairs,
in the current environment robust and non-political dispute resolution
regimes are imperative. There has been a qualitative change in the
character of disputants from basically state-sponsored litigants to pri-
268 For a discussion of attitudes of African countries towards international commercial arbi-
tration see Samuel K.B. Asante, The Perspectives of African Countries on International Commer-
cial Arbitration, 6 LmIEN J. INT'L L. 331 (1993).
269 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 27
LTS 157, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
270 Compare the EEC provision which provides that "Member States shall, as far as is neces-
sary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their
nationals,., the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforce-
ment of judgements of courts or tribunals and of arbitral awards." Treaty of Rome, supra note
81, art. 220.
271 Many a time municipal courts tend to regard arbitral awards as an intrusion into their
domain and begin to second guess decisions by arbitrators. Without a clear system which lays
down the circumstances under which an arbitral award may be challenged in a municipal court,
some judges may continue to frustrate the efficacy of arbitration.
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vate sector litigants necessitating an equally qualitative change in the
regimes governing dispute resolution.
The COMESA Court and other COMESA dispute resolution
mechanisms fall into this new appreciation. The ideas are bold and
the foresight admirable. The political resolve seems to be there and
the era of political gimmicks has seemingly been replaced with a sober
attitude towards economic integration. Developments in other re-
gions of the world, particularly in North America and the Pacific rim,
have added more urgency to the formulation of durable and pragmatic
paradigms for regional integration among developing countries. All
these factors operate in favor of the new COMESA framework.
Yet, as this article has shown, there remain areas whose vague-
ness could easily topple these achievements. A number of these
weaknesses are the result of poor drafting of the COMESA Treaty.
This need not be a handicap, and it may end up being an advantage if
in the processes of rectifying these mistakes a pragmatic and accepta-
ble system emerges. Municipal courts are going to be major players in
the new system but their past record is not enviable in this regard.
COMESA players seem to be exhibiting a preference for non-
COMESA dispute resolution systems and unless these players begin
to show more confidence in regional mechanisms, success will be
limited.
It is axiomatic that, within any regional economic organization,
the strength of its judicial tools determines the success of the process.
These legal structures are, in fact, the infrastructure that supports the
rest of the regional process.
